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INTRODUCTION 
People in the United States strongly support the simple idea that em­
ployers should not discriminate against gays and lesbians. In a 2003 Gallup 
poll, eighty-eight percent of respondents said that "homosexuals should . . .  
have equal rights in terms of job opportunities."1 Even prominent social con­
servatives-such as George W. Bush-give lip service to the idea that 
employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is wrong.2 
But gay rights advocates have achieved only modest legal reform on this 
issue. Seventeen states have prohibited employment discrimination against 
gays and lesbians.3 A seemingly modest bill, the Employment Non­
Discrimination Act (ENDA), which only prohibits disparate treatment on 
the basis of sexual orientation, has been introduced several times in Con­
gress, always without success.4 ENDA has little chance of passing during 
the Bush administration unless midterm elections in 2006 radically change 
the face of Congress.5 Civil rights advocates may even abandon ENDA and 
I. GEORGE GALLUP, JR., THE GALLUP POLL: PuBLIC OPINION 2003, at 162 (2004); see also 
Los ANGELES TIMES POLL ALERT: SELECTED RESULTS FROM THE TIMES POLL, GAY ISSUES SURVEY 
16 (Mar. 27-30, 2004 ), http://www.latimesinteractive.com/pdfarchive/nationworld/la-poll041104-
pdf.pdf (showing that seventy-two percent "favor . . .  laws to protect gays against job discrimina­
tion"). 
2. When asked whether he thought that gays and lesbians should have the same rights as 
other Americans, Bush said, "Yes. I don't think they ought to have special rights, but I think they 
ought to have the same rights." He subsequently denied knowing "the particulars" of the Employ­
ment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA), and so avoided saying whether or not he would support it, 
but did claim to be "the kind of person-I don't hire or fire somebody based upon their sexual orien­
tation . . . .  I support equal rights but not special rights for people." When asked to define "special 
rights," Bush said, "Well, it'd be if they're given special protective status." Online NewsHour: The 
Second Presidential Debate (Oct. 11, 2000), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/election/2000debates/ 
2ndebate3.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2005). 
3. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12940 (West 2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-8 lc  (West 
2004); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2 (2004); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 511-102 (2006); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 5, § 4572 (2005); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. 49B § 16 (LexisNexis 2005); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ch. !SIB, § 4 (2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.08 (West 2005); NEV. REV. STAT. 
§ 613.330 (LexisNexis 2005); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 354-A:7 (2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. 10:5-12 
(West 2002 & Supp. 2005); N.M. STAT.§ 28-1-7 (2005); N.Y. EXEC. LAW§ 296 (McKinney 2005); 
OR. REV. STAT.§ 659A.030 (2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 28-5-7 (2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495 
(2005). 
4. See infra Part II. 
5. President Clinton signed an executive order that prohibited discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation in employment within the federal civilian workforce. Exec. Order No. 13,087, 63 
Fed. Reg. 30,097 (May 28, 1998). George W. Bush left this executive order intact when he assumed 
office. Despite some uncertainty created by the Bush Administration Office of Special Counsel, the 
policy of nondiscrimination appears to remain in force. Civilrights.org, Under Pressure, Bush Ap­
pointee Restores GLBT Anti-Discrimination Information (Apr. 23, 2004), http:// 
www.civilrights.org/issues/glbt/details.cfm?id=22558. 
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instead promote a broader, omnibus civil rights improvement act, in which 
employment rights for gays would presumably play a part. 
This Article attempts to extend ENDA rights to individual employees by 
another means. The certification mark, a little-known piece of intellectual 
property, provides a mechanism for employers to commit to the exact sub­
stantive duties of ENDA. We have created a symbol, an FE inside a circle, 
that we call the "Fair Employment" mark. 
We have formally applied to the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
to register this symbol as a certification mark, which we would own.6 
The idea behind the Fair Employment mark is simple, really: by entering 
into the licensing agreement with us, an employer gains the right (but not 
the obligation) to use the mark and in return promises to abide by the word­
for-word strictures of ENDA. Displaying the mark signals to knowing con­
sumers and employees that the company manufacturing the product or 
providing the service has committed itself not to discriminate on the basis of 
sexual orientation. 
Other certification marks (such as the Good Housekeeping Seal and the 
Underwriters Laboratory and Orthodox Union marks) require the mark 
holder to police licensees to insure compliance with the requirements of the 
licensing agreement. But the licensing agreement for the Fair Employment 
mark allows employees and applicants to enforce the ENDA duties directly 
as express third-party beneficiaries of the agreement.7 The Fair Employment 
mark thus replicates the core enforcement mechanism of ENDA by creating 
private causes of action in the same class of individuals who would gain 
protection under the statute. 
The mark represents an incremental strategy in the struggle for equality. 
Most importantly, the mark holds out the possibility of extending substan­
tive ENDA rights-especially rights to sue for discrimination-to 
potentially hundreds of thousands of workers and applicants who are cur­
rently uncovered. 
But the mark also provides a "demonstration" effect. It provides mem­
bers of Congress with information that might quell concerns about whether 
they should support ENDA. The mark provides a mechanism for producing 
quasi-binding precedent about a statute before the statute is ever enacted. 
6. Office of Patents & Trademarks, Certification Mark Application Receipt (Feb. 17, 2005) 
(copy on file with author). 
7. A draft of the licensing agreement is on file with the authors and is included in the Ap­
pendix. See app. 
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The mark thus provides legislators with information about the ways a statute 
might be interpreted by courts, as well as the rates of litigation the statute 
might generate. 
Of course, these benefits of the mark will only accrue if employers actu­
ally sign the license agreement. Ay, there's the rub. "No employer in her 
right mind would volunteer to be a defendant in a lawsuit," our gentle read­
ers might reasonably protest. We appreciate this concern and devote a fair 
amount of space in this Article to argue that employers could rationally vol­
unteer for potential liability. 
Of the reasons employers might make themselves vulnerable, the most 
important is that "practicing" the mark might induce more sales. The mark 
provides another way supporters of gay rights can vote with their wallets, 
rewarding progressive policies and institutions. Just as consumers can travel 
and spend tourism dollars to support progressive state and local govern­
ments, so, too, they can reward companies that treat gay employees fairly, 
by purchasing their products and services. 
The mark might also help recruit employees and appease other input 
suppliers. Some employers might see little downside to signing the license 
agreement because their employees already have private rights of action 
under state law or local ordinance. Importantly (and at first blush somewhat 
paradoxically), some employers might sign to contain discrimination liabil­
ity since the licensing agreement mirrors ENDA's limitations on certain 
aspects of liability (for example, the 180-day filing requirement and no dis­
parate impact liability). Some firms might prefer to make discrimination 
liability subject to the specific terms of a contract rather than the expansive 
(and general) terms of an employee handbook. Still others may sign just 
because it is the right thing to do. 
Many, many employers have already included sexual orientation in non­
discrimination policies contained in employee handbooks. Employers often 
use their nondiscrimination policies to recruit employees and appease cus­
tomers, but during litigation some employers argue that an employee 
handbook does not constitute a promise not to discriminate. "At will" em­
ployment regimes in some states do not recognize employee handbooks as 
constraining employers' right to fire for any reason-including an em­
ployee's sexual orientation. By signing the license, an employer effectively 
waives this possible defense. 
The Article is divided into four parts. Part I describes the law of certifi­
cation marks and the potential benefits of the Fair Employment mark as a 
new type of federalism. Part II digs into the details of the licensing agree­
ment and defends the drafting choices that we made in tailoring the duties of 
licensees. Part III identifies employers that we predict would sign the 
mark-even in the face of potential boycotts and legal liability. Finally, Part 
IV takes on concerns about whether adoption of the mark will actually fur­
ther the greater goal of equality. 
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I. MARKING NONDISCRIMINATION 
Certification marks are used to signal that a product or service bearing 
the mark has met a specific standard set forth by the mark's owner, the li­
censor. Groups or individuals can register certification marks with the 
federal government much as we do trademarks.8 But certification marks are 
a distinct type of intellectual property because they are the only piece of IP 
that owners cannot "practice" themselves. 
A trademark owner must be involved in producing the item or providing 
the service that bears the mark.9 A certification mark owner, in contrast, 
must remain independent and may not produce any of the goods or services 
to which the mark applies. 10 Owners of certification marks cannot use the 
mark on any product that they manufacture. Only licensees are allowed to 
use the mark. The owner's job is to certify that the licensees conform to re­
quirements of the license so that the public can trust the quality or integrity 
of the product and its manufacturer. The owner of the mark is prohibited by 
law from practicing a self-produced mark, because self-certification is in­
herently self-interested. 
Certification marks account for a small percentage of intellectual prop­
erty. Owners of certification marks are held to high standards of conduct: 
decisions about whether to certify a product or service must be based exclu­
sively upon the criteria the owner has set for the mark. In other words, 
certification cannot be based on a user's willingness to pay a fee to the 
owner of the mark (other than a minimal fee covering administrative costs). 
In effect, the certifying entity must operate as a nonprofit. 
Seen in this light, the Fair Employment mark is a simple and traditional 
idea innovatively applied in a new context. Commerce in the United States 
has nurtured a venerable tradition of labeling products to improve work 
conditions for groups of oppressed people. Trade union labels first came 
into circulation as a way of promoting shorter work days. In 1869, the Car­
penter's Eight-Hour League of San Francisco created a stamp that permitted 
lumber mills to signal that they ran on an eight-hour schedule rather than a 
ten-hour schedule.11 This was typical of most union labels that followed, 
which were generally used to promote better working conditions and to 
guard against the use of tenement-house, sweatshop, and prison labor.12 By 
8. 15 U.S.C. § 1054 (2000). 
9. Id. § 1064. Licensing a trademark while giving up control of the product would consti-
tute abandonment of the mark under federal trademark law. Id. 
10. See id.; id. § 1054. 
11. ERNEST R. SPEDDEN, THE TRADE-UNION LABEL 10 n.2 (1910). 
12. BUREAU OF lNT'L LABOR AFFAIRS, U.S. 0EP'T OF LABOR, BY THE SWEAT AND TOIL OF 
CHILDREN: CONSUMER LABELS AND CHILD LABOR 7 (1997), http://www.dol.gov/ILAB/media/ 
reports/iclp/sweat4/sweat4.pdf. 
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the turn of the century, union labels were used by groups in many indus­
tries.13 
Although some early labeling schemes attempted to promote the quality 
or healthfulness of the product, the union label stood primarily for "better 
pay and improved work conditions."14 For example, even before Congress 
enacted legislation outlawing child labor, private organizations devised and 
administered labeling programs to promote products manufactured without 
the use of child labor.1 Now U.S. consumers are faced with a growing num­
ber of products manufactured in countries where employment laws are lax 
or nonexistent.16 In response to consumer concerns, many products in the 
United States bear marks relating to issues of moral import: environmental 
impact, animal testing, fair trade, sweatshops, and child labor. The Fair Em­
ployment mark would similarly permit consumers who care about gay rights 
to spend their money in ways consistent with their values. 
A. Minimalist Certification 
Although certification marks enjoy a long tradition, two aspects of the 
Fair Employment mark are quite nontraditional. First, we have structured 
the licensing agreement to minimize what we must certify as mark owners. 
While traditional certification-mark owners go out into the world and moni­
tor licensees to make sure they are complying with the requirements of the 
mark, we have structured the license agreement so that we can certify with­
out inspecting the licensee's employment practices. We do not certify that 
the employer does not discriminate. Instead, we certify two crucial things: 
The employer has promised not to discriminate in employment on the 
basis of sexual orientation. 
The employer has granted all of its employees and applicants express 
third-party beneficiary status to remedy any breach of the nondiscrimi­
nation promise. 
Because the licensing agreement expressly includes both of these ele­
ments, we can truthfully certify these matters merely by certifying that the 
licensee has signed the license. Any employer that signs the licensing 
agreement simultaneously gains a right to use the mark and meets the mini­
mum requisites for certification. At the same time, the licensee's employees 
gain a private right of action to enforce their quasi-ENDA rights. 
This minimalist certification structure has three advantages. First, it al­
lows a mark owner to provide meaningful certification with virtually no 
expense. Even though we do not certify that the employer does not dis-
13. Id. at 6. These groups included printers, bakers, wood workers, harness makers, iron 
molders, broom makers, coopers, photographers, shoemakers, custom tailors, mattress makers, 
blacksmiths, brewers, egg inspectors, barbers, and coal distributors. 
14. Id. at 29. 
15. Id. at 7-9. 
16. Id. 
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criminate, we are able to certify that the employer holds itself open to pri­
vate suits or other remedial actions for discrimination. To deny that this is 
meaningful would be to deny the value of private rights of action under Title 
VII and other civil rights laws. Second, this structure is transparent. It makes 
clear to employers that we, as mark owners, are not profiting from the mark. 
Because of this structure, employers can obtain a license to use the mark 
without paying us a licensing fee. Third, this licensing structure allows us to 
emulate more closely the ENDA private cause of action. Employers need 
not worry that the mark owners will engage in vexatious litigation, because 
we do not have a right to sue for violations of the nondiscrimination prom­
ise. 
B. Third-Party Beneficiaries 
The second and related innovation in the structure of the license con­
cerns the use of third-party beneficiary rights. In return for the right to use 
the mark, an employer expressly grants third-party beneficiary status to the 
same parties who could sue to enforce ENDA if it were enacted. Paragraph 
5 of the License reads as follows: 
THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARIES. Licensee and Licensor agree to desig­
nate as express third-party beneficiaries of this agreement all persons and 
entities that would be entitled to sue if ENDA were in effect (including 
governmental civil rights enforcement agencies). In particular, Licensee 
and Licensor designate as express third-party beneficiaries all persons who 
are or have been employed by the Licensee or applied for employment 
with the Licensee during the term of the license. The Licensee and Licen­
sor intend that these third-party beneficiaries will have the right to sue the 
Licensee for any breach of this agreement and have a legal right to the 
same remedies (including damages and injunctive relief) to which they 
would be entitled if ENDA were in effect.17 
Through this agreement, the mark owner altruistically grants potential 
private rights of action to third parties. 
While contract promises (including intellectual property licensing 
agreements) traditionally require a return element of consideration in order 
to be enforceable, it is well settled that express third-party beneficiaries can 
acquire enforceable contractual rights without providing consideration 
themselves. 18 So long as the consideration is provided by another party to 
the contract-in this case, by the mark owner in granting the licensee the 
17. See app. para. 5. 
18. 13 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 37:26 (4th ed. 2000) ("The rule 
regarding such situations has long been established: 'where one makes a promise to another for the 
benefit of a third person, such third person may avail himself of the promise and bring an action 
thereon, although the consideration does not move directly from him.'" (quoting Hale v. Ripp, 49 
N.W. 218, 219 (Neb. 1891))); see also Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Howard, 162 So. 683, 684 (Ala. 
1935) ("[I]f one person makes a promise for the benefit of a third party, such beneficiary may main­
tain an action thereon, though the consideration does not move from the latter."). 
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right to use the mark-the beneficiaries' right to nondiscrimination is en­
forceable.19 
In some cases, a genuine issue can arise about whether the plaintiff is a 
legitimate and intended third-party beneficiary of the contract. Courts and 
commentators have debated whether third parties can sue when they are 
merely unnamed, implicit third-party beneficiaries. But when the signatories 
to a contract expressly intend to authorize suit by a well-defined, clearly 
identified group, then a right of action is much more certain.20 The precise 
identities of individuals within a benefited group need not be known at the 
time of the contracting, as long as the agreement makes clear the character­
istics of the group as a whole.21 In the case of the mark, the licensing 
agreement explicitly makes job applicants and employees of the licensee the 
intended third-party beneficiaries of the contract. This is a finite, clearly 
defined population, subject to easy verification. 
The licensing agreement thus is an example of using third-party benefi­
ciary status to link a private contract to a public or social good. W hile this 
strategy is rarely deployed, there is no legal impediment to using consumer 
contracts, or other agreements, to combine private and public goals. The 
Fair Employment licensing agreement grants the right to use the mark, but 
only if the licensee agrees to create rights of action in third parties: the li­
censee's job applicants and employees. 
C. The Benefits of Privatizing ENDA 
Together, the license structure of minimal certification and third-party 
altruism allows the Fair Employment mark to effect a privatization of 
ENDA. Instead of the mandatory nondiscrimination duties of ENDA, the 
mark creates an opt-in mechanism for employers that want to contract af­
firmatively for ENDA duties. Richard Epstein has railed against the 
mandatory nature of Title VII and other civil rights duties, 22 but even he­
along with all thorough-going libertarians-ought to embrace the FE mark 
as expanding freedom of contract. 
The mark also represents a new form of federalism. We traditionally 
think of federalism as competition among jurisdictions, with individual 
19. Fourth Ocean Putnam Corp. v. Interstate Wrecking Co., 487 N.Y.S.2d 591, 594-95 (App. 
Div. 1985) ("It is true that where performance is to be made directly to a third party, there is at least 
'a presumption that the contract was for the benefit of the third party.' However, 'the intention of the 
promisee is of primary importance, since the promisee procured the promise by furnishing the con­
sideration therefor.' " (citations omitted)). 
20. 13 LORD, supra note 18, § 37:8 ("[A]s a general rule, a third party may enforce a promise 
as having been made for his benefit, if it appears from the promise or in the light of the surrounding 
circumstances that he was intended in fact to be a donee beneficiary of the promisee."). 
21. Pappas v. Jack 0.A. Nelsen Agency, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 721, 725-26 (Wis. 1978) ("Thus, 
the precise identity of the third-party beneficiary need not be ascertainable at the time of the agree­
ment so long as the agreement specifies or identifies a group or class to whom the party must belong 
to benefit thereby."). 
22. RICHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMI­
NATION LAWS (1992). 
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states acting as the laboratories for legal experimentation. The Fair Em­
ployment mark is an example of "corporate federalism," in which individual 
business organizations are allowed to experiment with different regulatory 
structures. Of course, any regime with freedom of contract allows corporate 
experimentation. But the Fair Employment mark allows a type of structured 
experimentation. It is thus akin to corporate statutes that give individual 
businesses discrete choices, e.g., opting into particular "control transaction" 
protections or opting out of certain duties of care.23 
1.  Amelioration 
If a substantial number of employers signed the license, 24 the mark 
would provide three different types of incremental benefits: amelioration, 
demonstration, and realignment. 25 First, the mark would ameliorate the 
problem of orientation discrimination for covered workers. Outside of the 
states that expressly provide private causes of action, employees sometimes 
have no legal remedy for claims of sexual orientation discrimination in em­
ployment. Even employers that include sexual orientation in their 
nondiscrimination policy are sometimes found not to have made a binding 
promise not to discriminate. 26 The extension of private causes of action to 
unprotected workers is not just a symbolic act. It would remedy real harms. 
As in the early years of Title VII, there are many examples of blatant dispa­
rate treatment in conditions of employment. Even in businesses that 
voluntarily adopt the mark and that genuinely oppose discrimination, gay 
and lesbian workers may be subject to blatant disparate treatment from 
managers or coworkers. 27 The mark provides a means to address these 
wrongs. 
23. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (2001) (opt-out law); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-2-
1110 to -1113, -1131 to -1133 (2003) (opt-in-via bylaw amendment-business combination and 
fair price laws). For a complete list of anti-takeover law statutes (most opt-out, a few mandatory, and 
only Georgia with opt-in), see PATRICK s. MCGURN & MARY FRANCES SPATOLA, STATE TAKEOVER 
LAWS (2d ed. 1995). For director liability statutes, see DEL. CooE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001) 
(opt-in regime), and Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(D) (LexisNexis 2004) (opt-out statute). 
24. Part III will predict which employers are most likely to sign the agreement. 
25. We have argued that our "inclusive command" proposal represents another incremental 
strategy for providing these three types of benefits with regard to employment discrimination in the 
military. See IAN AYRES & JENNIFER GERARDA BROWN, STRAIGHTFORWARD: How TO MOBILIZE 
HETEROSEXUAL SUPPORT FOR GAY RIGHTS 116-44 (2005); Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Ian Ayres, 
The Inclusive Command: Voluntary Integration of Sexual Minorities into the U.S. Military, 103 
MICH. L. REv. 150 (2004). 
26. This enforceability of nondiscrimination policies is discussed infra Part III.A. 
27. See, e.g., EMPIRE STATE PRIDE AGENDA, ANTI-GAY/LESBIAN DISCRIMINATION IN NEW 
YORK STATE 1 (2001), http://www.prideagenda.org/pride/survey.pdf ("In New York, anti-gay job 
discrimination in employment is pervasive, with more than one-third of the respondents (36%) 
experiencing some form of job-related discrimination within the last five years . . . .  8% were fired 
because of their sexual orientation . . . . 27% were verbally harassed at the workplace (e.g., being 
called names such as 'faggot,' 'dyke,' 'bulldagger,' 'sissy,' 'queer,' or other anti-gay words) . . . . 7% 
were physically harassed at the workplace because of their sexual orientation (e.g., being chased, 
followed, or threatened with physical violence) . . . .  10% were given a negative performance 
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2. Demonstration 
Second, if the mark succeeds, it will produce a demonstration effect that 
could inform Congress and state legislators about the advisability of passing 
ENDA or state laws prohibiting discrimination. If 500,000 employees were 
covered by the mark, legislators would learn something over time about ex­
pected litigation rates and the magnitude of potential liability. Granted, this 
litigation information would provide only a lower bound on potential claims 
since employers that volunteer for potential liability are less likely to have 
discriminatory practices than those that do not. But even this lower bound 
information is useful in demonstrating that ENDA would not open a flood­
gate of litigation. If in fact the litigation rates and awards are reasonably low 
under the mark,28 it would demonstrate that the form of potential liability 
proposed under the statute could be managed-by employees and covered 
employers alike. 
The inevitable litigation that would arise under the mark would also 
provide legislators with information about how courts might interpret 
ENDA if it were enacted. The Fair Employment mark allows courts for the 
first time to create persuasive precedent about the meaning of statutory lan­
guage before the statute is passed.29 At first, this seems impossible-statutes 
must be enacted before they can be interpreted. And if it were possible, why 
would this be the first time it ever happened? The simple answer is that to 
our knowledge the licensing agreement is the first private contract that ex­
plicitly adopts the words of a proposed statute in order to put its provisions 
into effect. 30 As shown in the Appendix, the licensing agreement expressly 
states its goal: "WHEREAS Licensee desires to privately commit to non­
discrimination as defined in the Employment Non-Discrimination Act 
(ENDA) as proposed in S. 1705, 108th Cong., 1" Sess. (2003)."31 This ver-
evaluation because of their sexual orientation."); see also Dave Munday, Gay Workers Fear for 
Their Jobs; Nondiscrimination Policies Still Scarce, PosT & COURIER, Apr. 4, 2004, at E l .  
28. Evidence from the states that have already provided for private rights o f  action shows 
that the rates of litigation are very low. U.S. GEN. AccouNTING OFFICE, PuBL'N No. GAO/OGC-98-
7R, SEXUAL-ORIENTATION-BASED EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: STATES' EXPERIENCE WITH 
STATUTORY PROHIBITIONS (1997) (explaining that in states with statutes making it illegal to dis­
criminate in employment on the basis of sexual orientation, relatively few formal complaints or 
lawsuits alleging such discrimination had been filed); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PuBL'N No. 
GA0/0GC-00-27R, SEXUAL-ORIENTATION-BASED EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: STATES' EX­
PERIENCE WITH STATUTORY PROHIBITIONS SINCE 1997 (2000) (arguing that both the number of 
complaints of sexual orientation discrimination in employment and the percentage of such com­
plaints as a portion of overall complaints of employment discrimination filed "may still be 
characterized as relatively small;" the number of lawsuits pursuant to these state laws was even 
smaller). 
29. Of course, the precedent will not be persuasive in all cases because some canons of con­
tract interpretation are inconsistent with canons of statutory interpretation. For instance, although 
policy goals will often inform statutory interpretation, public policy implications will usually take a 
distant second to party intent when courts construe a contract. And statutes are not generally con­
strued against the drafting party. 
30. Much more common is the reference to statutes or other public law in contracts specifi­
cally designed by parties to opt out of the default. 
31. App. pmbl. 
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sion of the ENDA bill is attached to the license; the substantive "Standards 
of Fair Employment" included in the license are taken word-for-word from 
the bill. Thus, when a court is asked to interpret the meaning of the words in 
the license, it will be interpreting the same words that appear in the pro­
posed bill. Even though the court will be interpreting a contractual promise, 
the foregoing "whereas" clause will lead the court to ask whether the em­
ployer's conduct would have run afoul of ENDA had the bill been enacted. 
Information about how courts will interpret ENDA can help quell legis­
lative concerns about supporting the bill. Even though the next Section will 
show that the bill is a narrow prohibition of disparate treatment alone, legis­
lators may still worry that "activist judges" will extend the statute beyond its 
borders. Even though the statute does not reach discrimination on the basis 
of gender identity and expression, legislators may be concerned that ENDA 
will restrict employers' ability to regulate employee appearance and con­
duct. Resolving these possible ambiguities can ease the bill's passage-in 
part because the legislators can expressly approve or disapprove of such 
precedent. Just as Congress expressly disapproved of some Supreme Court 
precedent and expressly approved of other precedent when it passed the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, so too Congress would have the option of explic­
itly embracing or rejecting particular court interpretations of the Fair 
Employment mark licensing agreement when considering whether to pass 
ENDA. The substantive language of the nondiscrimination requirement in a 
future proposal of ENDA might even change in response to this precedent. 
There are important differences between pre-passage license precedent 
and post-passage ENDA precedent. As a formal matter, an interpretation of 
contractual language would not be binding on a court interpreting statutory 
language in a post-passage case. This is particularly true when different 
courts are involved. With the exception of a few federal cases brought under 
diversity jurisdiction, the bulk of the license precedent would come from 
state courts, while post-passage ENDA interpretations would result from 
federal litigation. Federal courts might be reluctant to defer to state court 
interpretations of federal statutory language--especially when those inter­
pretations had occurred before the federal statute had been passed. Then 
again, affirmative references to these state court decisions in the congres­
sional record when the statute is subsequently enacted could radically raise 
the precedential value of the state court decisions. 
The flip side is that congressional action could also render this pre­
passage license precedent irrelevant. The language of many bills is signifi­
cantly amended before passage. The language of proposed legislation often 
changes from year to year as revised bills are introduced in successive legis­
lative sessions. Our licensing agreement takes account of this possibility by 
allowing us to update the licensing language on an ongoing basis, keeping 
pace with the legislative state of play.32 
32. Although we, as owners of the_mark, may not unilaterally modify the license, we intend 
to propose modifications to confonn the license to updated versions of the bill that are fonnally 
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3. Realignment 
Finally, the coverage of a substantial number of employees creates new 
legislative opportunities that might serve as a wedge issue to realign politi­
cians who currently oppose ENDA. At first, it might seem that ENDA 
already represents an irreducible legislative minimum. It is carefully crafted 
solely to prohibit disparate treatment. It does not allow disparate-impact 
claims or claims for health benefits by unmarried domestic partners. It ex­
pressly does not require affirmative action. It would seem that there is not 
much left on which gay rights proponents could compromise. 33 
The Fair Employment mark, however, illuminates new opportunities for 
compromise. These areas of compromise emerge when we consider the in­
herent limits on freedom of contract illustrated by the mark. There are some 
things parties to a contract cannot effect, and these gaps give Congress a 
chance to act. The most important respect in which the licensing agreement 
cannot replicate ENDA is the enforcement regime. Under ENDA, the Justice 
Department and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC)-as well as individual employees and applicants-would be em­
powered to sue employers that discriminate. The licensing agreement goes 
as far as it can in naming as third-party beneficiaries this same set of plain­
tiffs: to wit, "all persons and entities that would be entitled to sue if ENDA 
were in effect."34 This is an attempt to grant government actors enforcement 
power. Yet while this provision is sufficient consent on the part of the corpo­
rate licensee for such enforcement, the government actors need separate 
legislative authorization to be able to bring an ENDA-like enforcement ac­
tion. Put simply, private parties by themselves cannot give the Justice 
Department or the EEOC power to sue-they need congressional action for 
that. 
However, each licensing agreement could be seen as an invitation to 
congressional action. If a million employees were covered by the license, 
gay rights advocates might lobby Congress to empower the civil rights 
agencies to enforce the nondiscrimination policy against those corporations 
that had volunteered. Such an "opt-in" enforcement statute might gamer the 
support of legislators who have been reluctant to impose ENDA's require­
ments on unwilling companies. 
Indeed, it is a short step to see the license agreement not only as a vehi­
cle for "opt-in" enforcement, but also as a call for an "opt-in" version of 
ENDA itself. Congress might easily displace the need for the mark's con­
tractual commitment by passing a statute that makes ENDA duties binding 
only on companies that affirmatively opt for the statute-possibly by for-
introduced into Congress. New licensees will opt into the latest version of the ENDA bill (or compa­
rable legislation). 
33. In fact. ENDA could be pared back on a number of other grounds. For example, class 
actions could be prohibited or damages could be more severely capped. 
34. App. para. 5. 
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mally registering with the EEOC.35 Free-market conservatives simply have 
no argument to resist such legislation. Richard Epstein, for example, at­
tacked the mandatory nature of Title VII in his 1992 book, Forbidden 
Grounds.36 For Epstein, the chief evil of Title VII is that it restricts freedom 
of contract. But Epstein should have no problem with a statute that permits 
firms to decide whether they want to be covered by civil rights laws. 
Indeed, Epstein's criticism of the mandatory nature of Title VII only 
suggests that lawmakers should permit firms to contract around the default 
set of rights regarding employment discrimination. This kind of criticism 
tells us nothing about what the appropriate default rule should be.37 Ep­
stein's argument in Forbidden Grounds is a contractual non sequitur. If 
Epstein believes that the mandatory nature of a civil rights law is unwar­
ranted, he can certainly suggest that legislators make the statutory duty 
waivable. Epstein needs a separate kind of argument-which he never pro­
vides-to show that an opt-in statute is superior to an opt-out statute.38 
Epstein argues for the repeal of Title VII (implicitly turning it into an opt-in 
statute, creating no employment rights unless employers affirmatively con­
tract for them), but he does not consider whether an opt-out default would 
be superior. 
The same opt-in/opt-out debate lies at the end of this ENDA thought ex­
periment. Once Congress begins to consider the opt-in version of ENDA 
described above, it is natural to ask whether an opt-out version of ENDA 
might be even better. Both are formally equivalent from a libertarian free­
dom-of-contract perspective because both give employers the identical legal 
option to embrace or avoid nondiscrimination duties. But default choice 
matters. Default inertia is the iron law of contracting.39 We would undoubt­
edly see more employees covered by nondiscrimination promises in the 
shadow of an opt-out statute than an opt-in statute.40 While the Fair Em­
ployment mark comes close to replicating the effects of an opt-in statute, 
only lawmakers can create an opt-out statute. 
Stepping back, we can now see a variety of opportunities for incre­
mental legislative progress. While the minimalistic ENDA duties initially 
35. Such a statute would have to govern the conditions under which a firm might subse­
quently "opt out" of coverage. In the spirit of incrementalism, we believe that this should be allowed 
as long as there was sufficient public notice. 
36. EPSTEIN, supra note 22. 
37. See generally Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An 
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L. J. 87 (1989) [hereinafter Ayres & Gertner, Filling 
Gaps in Incomplete Contracts]; Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian De­
faults, 51 STAN. L. REv. 1591 (1999) [hereinafter Ayres & Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian 
Defaults]. 
38. Ian Ayres, Empire or Residue: Competing Visions of the Contractual Canon, in LEGAL 
CANONS 47, 58 (J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson eds., 2000). 
39. Put formally, in equilibrium when rule Xis the default, one would expect to see a higher 
proportion of contractors covered by rule X than by any other term. See Ayres & Gertner, Majori­
tarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, supra note 37, at 1598. 
40. Ayres, supra note 38, at 58. 
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did not appear amenable to statutory compromise, we have identified three 
incremental way stations that become visible as a consequence of the Fair 
Employment mark. First, Congress might empower the federal civil rights 
agencies to enforce the mark's duties against voluntary licensees. Second, 
Congress might displace the mark by creating an opt-in ENDA statute. And 
most expansively, Congress might create an opt-out ENDA statute allowing 
employers to avoid potential liability by publicly disclaiming the statute's 
nondiscrimination duties. While the Fair Employment mark goes a long way 
toward replicating the rights and responsibilities of the proposed statute, 
these final two default statutes would solve both the precedential and en­
forcement deficits of the mark. Precedents created under either an opt-in or 
opt-out statute would be solid federal precedent in the event of later manda­
tory passage of the statute. And these contractible statutes would create the 
public enforcement add-on that is currently missing from the licensing 
agreement. 
II. TAILORING THE COVERAGE OF THE LICENSING AGREEMENT 
This Part defends in more detail what is included in and excluded from 
our licensing agreement. As for inclusion, we have simply tried to impose as 
nearly as possible the legal duties of ENDA, a bill that has been proposed 
repeatedly since 1993 but has not yet been enacted by Congress.41 The cen­
tral goal of the bill was to grant employees and applicants a private right of 
action if they are subject to disparate treatment because of their sexual ori­
entation. In effect, ENDA would include sexual orientation in the group of 
characteristics that Title VII already makes off-limits as the basis for the 
terms and conditions of employment.42 Paragraph 4 of the licensing agree­
ment sets out these substantive duties: 
STANDARDS OF FAIR EMPLOYMENT. Licensee promises not to en­
gage in the following employment practices: 
( 1) "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to the compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment of the individual, be­
cause of such individual's sexual orientation;" ENDA, S. 1705, § 4 
(a)(l) (attached hereto) or 
(2) "to limit, segregate, or classify the employees or applicants for em­
ployment of the employer in any way that would deprive or tend to 
deprive any individual of employment or otherwise adversely affect the 
41. See J. Banning Jasiunas, Note, ls ENDA the Answer? Can a "Separate but Equal" Fed­
eral Statute Adequately Protect Gays and Lesbians from Employment Discrimination?, 61 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1529 (2000). In using the language of ENDA, we are placing the words of Chai Feldblum, one 
of its principal drafters, into our licensing agreement. See generally Georgetown University, Chai R. 
Feldblum, http://www.law.georgetown.edu/curriculum/tab_faculty.cfm?Status=Faculty&Detail=251 
(last visited Apr. 20, 2005). 
42. Representative Barney Frank, a supporter of ENDA, has stated that ENDA would result 
in legal protection "for gay and lesbian people" identical to the protections granted by Title VII. 
Jasiunas, supra note 41, at 1545-46. 
June 2006] Mark( et)ing Nondiscrimination 1653 
status of the individual as an employee, because of such individual's 
sexual orientation;" ENDA, S. 1705, § 4 (a)(2) (attached hereto) 
(3) to discriminate against any individual because of the sexual orientation 
of the individual "in admission to, or employment in, any program es­
tablished to provide apprenticeship or other training;" ENDA, S. 1705, 
§ 4(d) (attached hereto) 
(4) to discriminate against an individual because such individual opposed 
any of the employment practices described in subsections (1) through 
(3), "or because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or 
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing" 
concerned with this License. ENDA, S. 1705, § 5 (attached hereto) 
The employment practices described in any of subsections (I) through (3) 
"shall be considered to include an action described in that subsection, 
taken against an individual based on the sexual orientation of a person with 
whom the individual associates or has associated." ENDA, S. 1705, § 4 (e) 
(attached hereto).43 
But unlike Title VII, our license follows ENDA in expressly limiting its 
coverage to claims of disparate treatment. Like ENDA, the licensing agree­
ment expressly disclaims disparate-impact and affirmative-action duties and 
does not require employers to provide employee benefits to domestic part-44 ners. 
In tailoring the coverage of the license, we cleave to the ENDA duties 
for several reasons. First, they are clear and simple. The idea of having a 
legally enforceable private right of action to be free from disparate treatment 
in employment on the basis of an impermissible characteristic resonates 
with a core conception of civil rights. By excluding disparate impact cover­
age, we make it harder to characterize the license as "a quota bill." By 
eschewing any duty of affirmative action, we hope to silence those who 
would complain about "special rights." 
Moreover, the ENDA duties have become a focal point of debate, draft­
ing, and lobbying. The substantive language of our license has been 
repeatedly introduced into Congress. Over a hundred corporations have said 
that they want the bill to be passed.45 Potential licensees do not need to fly­
speck whether they agree with our particular drafting choices. Just as we 
disclaim enforcement power to assure potential licensees that we will not be 
vexatious litigators, so we disclaim drafting power in choosing the contours 
43. App. para. 4. 
44. See id. paras. 6 and 7. 
45. For the full list of companies, see Human Rights Campaign Foundation, Corporations 
and Small Businesses Endorsing the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA), 
http://www.hrc.org{femplate.cfm?Section=Endorsing_ENDA&CONTENTID= 17977 &TEMPLATE 
=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm (last visited Apr. 20, 2005). 
1654 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 104: 1 639 
of licensee duties to assure them that we have not inserted an unduly bur­
densome or unreasonable requirement.46 
In keeping with this principle, we have not attempted to reengineer or 
improve upon the ENDA duties. Since ENDA would allow class actions, our 
license would allow class actions.47 Since ENDA would allow suits for co­
worker harassment, our license would allow suits for coworker harassment.48 
But our license would also allow the same employer countermoves to 
limit potential liability. Since ENDA would allow arbitration agreements, 
our license would as well. Under ENDA (as with Title VII), discrimination 
disputes would be arbitrable so long as the arbitration agreement was con­
scionable.49 We believe the same standards should generally apply to the 
licensing agreement, ENDA, and Title VII.50 The ability to channel employ­
ment disputes into arbitration has been important to many employers. 
Arbitration can also be a valuable way to manage risk and curtail potential 
liability, particularly for employers that are repeat players.51 Since ENDA 
46. The license is thus an example of what Ian Ayres and Barry Nalebuff have called the 
KISS principal-"Keep It Similar, Stupid." The idea is that securing support for an innovation is 
often easier when the implementation will be similar to that of a familiar plan; in this way, the po­
tential adopter is not overwhelmed with change and can focus on the crucial innovative element. See 
IAN AYRES & BARRY NALEBUFF, W HY NoT? How TO USE EVERYDAY INGENUITY TO Sot.VE PROB­
LEMS BIG AND SMALL 203-08 (2003). 
47. Section 12(b) of ENDA states that "[t]he procedures and remedies applicable to a claim 
alleged by an individual for a violation of this Act are . . .  the procedures and remedies applicable 
for a violation of [T]itle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.)." H.R. 3285, 
108th Cong. § I 2(b) (2003 ). Courts have long held that class actions are available and, indeed, often 
necessary in Title VII cases. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426 (197 1 )  ("Con­
gress provided, in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1 964, for class actions for enforcement of 
provisions of the Act."); Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888, 891 (5th Cir. 1970) (de­
ciding that the court would construe Title VII to allow for class actions "to make sure that the Act 
works"); Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 34 (5th Cir. 1968) ("[l]f class-wide relief were 
not afforded . . .  the result would be the incongruous one of the Court . . .  itself being the instrument 
of racial discrimination . . . .  "); Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp., 251 F. Supp. 184, 186 (M.D. Tenn. 1 966) 
("Racial discrimination is by definition a class discrimination."). 
48. An employer may be liable for coworker harassment under Title VII if the employer's 
negligence creates a "hostile work environment." Ocheltree v. Scollon Productions, Inc., 335 F.3d 
325, 330-32, 334 (4th Cir. 2003) ("An employer cannot avoid Title VII liability for coworker har­
assment by adopting a 'see no evil, hear no evil' strategy."). 
49. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 1 05 (2001) (holding that a contract 
requiring arbitration of all employment disputes is enforceable under federal law), remanded to 279 
F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that ordinary principles of state contract law determine validity of 
agreement to arbitrate and, because arbitration agreement was both procedurally and substantively 
unconscionable under California law, it was unenforceable), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1112 (2002). 
50. Arguably, since the licensing agreement does not include an arbitration clause, job appli­
cants would be free to litigate claims arising from it. Even employees who signed employment 
contracts containing arbitration clauses might be able to litigate violations of the employment mark, 
qua third-party beneficiaries of the licensing agreement. The scope of the arbitration clause within 
the employment contract could be broad enough, however, to include the licensing agreement, since 
a violation of the licensing agreement would certainly "arise out of or relate to" the contract of 
employment. 
51. Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTs. & 
EMP. PoL' Y J. 189, 209 (1997) (arguing that employees lose more often, and arbitrators award dam­
ages to employees less frequently and in lower amounts, when the employer is a repeat player); Lisa 
B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of 
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would allow waiver of class action rights, so would our license.52 And fi­
nally, since ENDA would require filing of claims within 180 days of the 
occurrence of a violation, so would our license.53 
Our meta-goal is to come as close as possible to ENDA rights and re­
sponsibilities without ever going beyond them (that is, without ever 
imposing more duties on employers than would be imposed by the statute). 
We have already discussed a couple of dimensions in which our license falls 
short of ENDA: it does not grant civil rights agencies an independent ability 
to enforce, and it cannot create federal court jurisdiction to hear claims aris­
ing under our license.54 Our license may also fall short of ENDA with regard 
to certain remedies. Private parties may not contract for punitive damages.55 
Thus, even if punitive damages would be available to plaintiffs under 
ENDA, courts may be unwilling to grant them to plaintiffs for breach of the 
licensing agreement. Similar logic may restrict courts' willingness to grant 
certain types of injunctive relief. Specific enforcement of promises is at 
times restricted by a variety of doctrines (such as the irreparable-harm rule) 
that are not at play in remedying statutory civil rights claims.56 These 
Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 McGEORGE L. REV. 223, 234 ( 1998) (noting that in repeat 
player cases, employees recover only eleven percent of what they demand, but in cases against em­
ployers that are not repeat players, they recover about forty-eight percent of what they demand). 
52. Many arbitration agreements do not provide for class actions. As long as the arbitration 
agreement is not found to be unconscionable, waivers of class action rights will be upheld. See, e.g., 
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 ( 1991 )  (upholding waiver of class action 
rights in arbitration of claims arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Livingston 
v. Assocs. Fin., Inc., 339 F.3d 553 (7th Cir. 2003) (enforcing an arbitration agreement prohibiting 
class actions of claims arising under Truth in Lending Act); Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 244 
F.3d 8 14, 8 1 7-18 ( 1 1 th Cir. 2001 )  (same); Johnson v. W. Suburban B ank, 225 F.3d 366, 377-78 (3d 
Cir. 2000) (same), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1 145 (2001). But see Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 
F.3d 1 165, 1 172-73 (9th Cir. 2003) (striking down arbitration agreement for unconscionability in 
part due to its prohibition of class actions). 
53. See app. para. 1 4  ("Any lawsuit by a third-party beneficiary for violation of the Standards 
of Fair Employment shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged violating 
employment practice occurred."). Section 12(b) of ENDA ordains that "[t]he procedures and reme­
dies applicable to a claim alleged by an individual for a violation of this Act are . . .  the procedures 
and remedies applicable for a violation of [T]itle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 
2000e et seq.)." See H.R. 3285, 108th Cong. § 1 2(b) (2003). And 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)( l )  states 
that charges of unlawful discrimination must be filed with the EEOC within 1 80 days of the occur­
rence. There is one dimension in which our license arguably goes beyond ENDA. ENDA would 
require private plaintiffs to file a charge with the EEOC and obtain a "right to sue" letter before 
suing in federal court. (A similar duty to file with the state human rights commission is in place in 
California under its state nondiscrimination statute). Plaintiffs under our license would not need to 
exhaust this administrative remedy before filing suit. Although this might impose fewer procedural 
burdens on license-based plaintiffs, it is important to remember that exhaustion of administrative 
remedies does not substantively burden plaintiffs because plaintiffs in any case retain a right to sue. 
Therefore the substantive effects of ENDA/Title VII and the license agreement should be the same. 
54. But as discussed supra Section I.C.3, Congress could empower these agencies to enforce 
the license against licensees and to allow enforcement by private or public plaintiffs in federal court. 
55. Punitive damages can arise out of bad faith conduct or promissory fraud. See generally 
IAN AYRES & GREGORY KLASS, INSINCERE PROMISES: THE LAW OF MISREPRESENTED INTENT 
(2005). 
56. See Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 687 
( 1990). The trend seems to be toward enforcement of specific performance clauses. See U.C.C. § 2-
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shortfalls from ENDA point out the limits of contracting. But at the end of 
the day, the license comes reasonably close to recreating the statutory du­
ties, and the license's deviations from ENDA (especially the restriction on 
punitive damages) should assuage employer fears about signing on to unlim­
ited liability. 
We have also intentionally granted licensees the power to change their 
minds. While the term of the license is five years (and by default automati­
cally renews), we allow licensees to terminate the agreement at any time and 
for any reason. In contrast, we as licensors ·can terminate the agreement 
prior to the term of the agreement only for cause-that is, if the licensee 
violates the standard for Fair Employment. This asymmetry in termination 
rights is intended to assure licensees in yet another way that they have sub­
stantial control over their fate if their perceived liability or other risk 
exceeds their expectations. 
Although the minimalism and focal nature of our license duties have 
considerable appeal, some readers might protest that we have set the bar too 
low. While ENDA clearly represents a major advance in employment pro­
tections for gay men and lesbians, the bill's proponents in Congress have 
had to limit its reach in order to make it more politically palatable. The stat­
ute has an understandably modest goal. But as applied to the license, is this 
goal too modest? Considering that the license is a voluntary choice of em­
ployers (who in part are seeking a marketing advantage), should the license 
duties be expanded to secure more than a simple promise not to discriminate? 
In the remainder of this Part, we explore five potential expansions in 
coverage. The first four concern substantive licensor duties related to gender 
identity and expression, healthcare coverage for employees' same-sex do­
mestic partners, the Human Rights Campaign Corporate Equality Index,57 
and affiliate corporations (concerning alternative enforcement options). As 
important and helpful as all of these potential expansions might be, in the 
end, we believe it is useful to retain a license that mirrors the language of 
ENDA as formally proposed in Congress. The good news is that in this 
world of corporate voluntarism, we need not make either/or decisions. The 
Fair Employment mark is entirely consistent with these more ambitious ap­
proaches to LGBT employment protection. Corporations are contractually 
free to embrace both our ENDA-based Fair Employment mark as well as 
additional obligations to their employees. 
7 1 6  cmt. 1 ( 1999) ("[T]his Article seeks to further a more liberal attitude than some courts have 
shown in connection with the specific performance of contracts of sale."). 
57. The Human Rights Campaign (HRC) is America's largest gay, lesbian, bisexual, and 
transgender civil-rights organization. HRC lobbies Congress, mobilizes grassroots action in diverse 
communities, invests strategically in congressional campaigns, and increases public understanding 
through education and communication. See Human Rights Campaign Foundation, About the Human 
Rights Campaign: Our Mission Statement, http://www.hrc.org!femplate.cfm?Section=About_HRC 
(last visited Jan. 25, 2006). 
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A. Gender Identity and Expression 
Probably the most troubling drafting choice we made concerns gender 
identity. By excluding gender identity and gender expression from protected 
status, our licensing agreement follows the contours of every version of 
ENDA that has been introduced in Congress to date. This means that trans­
gender employees would not be covered.58 In the view of ENDA's chief 
congressional sponsors, including gender identity or expression in the bill 
would effectively make it impossible to enact.59 
Gender identity illustrates well the difficult choices that an incremental 
approach requires. Is it ever appropriate to secure gains for only some? Is it 
moral to jettison the T in the LGBT community? Our license, like ENDA, 
sacrifices the interests of transgendered people-leaving them out of the 
calculus-in its attempt to secure a basic civil right for gay, lesbian, and 
bisexual employees.60 The idea of incrementalism works on the assumption 
(or, at least, the hope) that fair treatment on the basis of sexual orientation is 
a step in the right direction, a step that brings us closer to fair treatment on 
the basis of gender identity at some point in the not-too-distant future. Such 
pragmatic choices, though difficult, are not unique to this issue. Civil rights 
advocates have constantly struggled with the question of when and whether 
to push for "half a loaf."61 
58. Transgender is a broad term to cover a variety of gender identities; the term can refer to 
cross-dressers, pre- and post-op transsexuals, inter-sexed people (those born with ambiguous genita­
lia, or both male and female sex characteristics), and bi-gendered people (who feel comfortable in 
both male and female identities). When gender identity or expression is omitted from employment 
protection, employers can use behavior or characteristics that are gender nonconforming as the basis 
for disparate treatment. 
59. Adrian Brune, HRC Vows No ENDA if No Trans P rotection: Dramatic Policy Shift Fol­
lows Protests, Lobbying Effon, WASH. BLADE, Aug. 1 3, 2004, available at http:// 
www.washingtonblade.com/2004/8- 1 3/news/national/enda.cfm (quoting Winnie Stachelberg, Hu­
man Rights Campaign's political director, as saying in 2003, "Now is not the time to add gender 
identity to ENDA. I listen to members of Congress and many of them-not all of them, but many­
have said adding [transgender protections] will slow passage of this bill down."); Roslyn Manley, 
New "Unified" Bill to Replace ENDA, http://www.tgcrossroads.org/news/archive.asp?aid=740 (last 
visited Jan. 8, 2006) (quoting Barney Frank as saying, "Maybe [adding protections for gender 
identity or expression] won't cause any loss of support. Maybe it's an easy inclusion. This is what 
we have to check and see . . . .  Connecticut Republican Christopher Shays, one of ENDA's lead 
sponsors, has already signaled that he will drop off the bill if gender rights language is added."). 
60. We should note, however, that even putting aside the interests of trans gender employees, 
some have argued that gay, lesbian, and bisexual employees need gender identity and expression in 
ENDA to gain full protection. To the extent that gay, lesbian, and bisexual employees exhibit char­
acteristics or behavior that do not conform to gender stereotypes or expectations, employers would 
be able legally to subject them to disparate treatment on a basis separate from sexual orientation. 
Because sexual orientation and other aspects of gender can be difficult to disentangle, some argue, 
gender identity and expression protection is necessary in order to give gay, lesbian, and bisexual 
employees full protection. See Cheryl Jacques, Putting the ' T '  into ENDA: HRC 's Board Has De­
cided Not to Support ENDA Without Transgender Protections, WASH. BLADE, Aug. 13 ,  2004, 
available at http://www.washingtonblade.com/2004/8-1 3/view/columns/putting.cfm. 
6 1 .  In Connecticut in 2005, for example, marriage equality advocates had to make tough 
choices about whether to support a bill that granted civil-union but not full-marriage rights to same­
sex couples. If, as German-Prussian politician Otto Von Bismarck once remarked, "politics is the art 
of the possible," such compromises can be justified as ways of doing what is "possible" as soon as 
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In the past, the Human Rights Campaign (HRC) has been the primary 
gay-rights lobbying group supporting ENDA as proposed, despite HRC's 
general position that gender identity also deserves protection. But HRC has 
more recently moved toward inclusion. In the summer of 2004, HRC an­
nounced that it would not support any version of ENDA that excluded 
gender identity.62 
While reasonable people of good faith can differ on this difficult issue, 
we cleave to the existing exclusion of gender identity in ENDA solely for 
pragmatic reasons. Barney Frank says that he has always wanted trans­
gender protection in ENDA; nonetheless, he says, 
Civil rights bills have never passed as all or nothing . . . .  You go in steps. 
The first civil rights bills didn't include voting or housing, but that didn't 
stop us from trying to get them passed. Every time you pass a partial civil­
rights bill you reduce the fears you will run into for the next version.63 
Gender identity has been excluded from every version of ENDA intro­
duced in Congress because sponsors believe that including gender identity 
would doom such a bill to defeat. For many employers, inclusion of gender 
identity in the company's written nondiscrimination policy would be seen as 
too radical a move to be attempted, and they would opt out of using the 
mark despite their willingness to include sexual orientation in the policy. 
Just as the anxiety of the shower has driven military discrimination,64 it is 
our sense that a certain anxiety of the restroom (as in, "which bathroom will 
he/she use?") has fueled the reaction to coverage of gender identity. Only 58 
of the 379 companies rated in HRC's Corporate Equality Index survey made 
reference to gender identity characteristics or expression in their primary 
nondiscrimination statements.65 However, things may continue to change 
and change quickly. Our intention is to conform the license to the poten­
tially evolving language of ENDA as reflected in legislation embraced by 
major congressional cosponsors. As long as Barney Frank favors its exclu­
sion, we are likely to as well-but not without regret. 
possible. Mark Pazniokas, Just One Hitch Before OK, House Adds 'Marriage ' Definition, HARTFORD 
CouRANT, Apr. 14, 2005, at A. I .  
62. See Brune, supra note 59. Compare Press Release, AFL-CIO, Employment Non­
Discrimination Act (ENDA) (June 24, 1 999), http://www.aflcio.org/mediacenter/prsptm/ 
pr0624al999.cfm ("[T]he AFL-CIO strongly urges Congress to pass the 'Employment Non­
Discrimination Act (ENDA).' ") with Jeremy Bishop, An Injury To One Is An Injury To All, Trans 
Rights (Aug. 5, 2004), http://prideatwork.org/public/documents/press/2004/An%20Injury%20To% 
200ne%20Is%20An%20Injury%20To%20All,%20Trans%20Rights.pdf (arguing that the labor 
movement must require transgender protections in any employment discrimination legislation it 
supports). 
63. Stefen Styrsky, Decision Day on Trans Rights: Human Rights Campaign Board Meets 
Amidst Growing Demand for Trans-inclusive Legislation, GAY CITY NEWS, Aug. 5, 2004, 
http://www.gaycitynews.com/gcn_332/decisiondayontrans.html. 
64. See Kendall Thomas, Shower/Closet, 20 ASSEMBLAGE 80 ( 1993). 
65. See HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUNDATION, CORPORATE EQUALITY INDEX: ON GAY, 
LESBIAN, BISEXUAL AND ThANSGENDER SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 1 4  (2004), http://www.hrc.org 
(follow "Publications" hyperlink; then follow "Corporate Equality Index" hyperlink; then follow 
"2004 Corporate Equality Index" hyperlink). 
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B. Healthcare Coverage 
Another dimension in which the license could be more ambitious, and 
go beyond ENDA, concerns healthcare coverage. The license could also 
mandate the provision of healthcare and other benefits for employees' same­
sex domestic partners.66 The mark might require this as a way of responding 
to the state's own discrimination in denying marriage to same-sex couples. 
In jurisdictions where same-sex couples cannot signal their commitment 
through civil marriage, they are unfairly harmed by employment policies 
that condition certain benefits upon civil marriage. 
Employers that refuse to extend health benefits in this way could argue 
that they are treating all employees equally: gay or straight, employees re­
ceive family health benefits, but only if they are married. But such a 
response misses the point. This is not a case in which the harm arises from 
treating similarly-situated people differently. Instead, the harm results from 
treating differently-situated people the same, without regard for the back­
ground conditions of inequality that cause this treatment to affect them in 
different ways. 
The trouble is that an employment policy extending health benefits to 
same-sex but not different-sex domestic partners could be seen as discrimi­
nating against heterosexuals, thus violating the nondiscrimination policy 
that forbids discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. To mandate 
health benefits only for employees' same-sex domestic partners could be 
seen as a form of affirmative action-which would be inconsistent with 
ENDA and could allow critics to attack the license as granting gay and les­
bian workers "special rights." 
To avoid this reverse disparate treatment, the Fair Employment mark 
could require licensees to offer health benefits to employees' domestic part­
ners, regardless of gender. Many companies have voluntarily achieved this 
standard already. Whether out of a corporate ethic of fairness to all employ­
ees, or out of a recognition that gay men and lesbians can be valuable 
employees worth recruiting, more and more companies are including do­
mestic partners in employee benefits packages. In fact, recent studies show 
that more than 4000 U.S. companies offer their employees domestic-partner 
health benefits, including nearly half of the Fortune 500 companies.67 Thus, 
nothing in the license would prohibit an employer from doing what thou-
66. Some employers might also want to make these benefits available to employees' differ­
ent-sex domestic partners, but in our view, an employer's decision not to cover different-sex 
domestic partners should not preclude use of the Fair Employment mark. Because different-sex 
couples have the option of marrying and thereby gaining employment benefits, while same-sex 
couples cannot (except in Massachusetts), it seems fair to include unmarried same-sex couples, but 
not unmarried different-sex couples in the benefits package. If the employer operates in a state that 
extends equal marriage rights to same-sex couples, the need for domestic partner benefits might 
similarly dissipate; discriminating on the basis of marital status need not have a disparate impact on 
gay people. 
67. DARYL HERRSCHAFT & KIM I. MILLS, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUNDATION, THE 
STATE OF THE WORKPLACE FOR LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND ThANSGENDER AMERICANS 2003 
(2004), http://www.hrc.org (follow "Publications" hyperlink; then follow "State of the Workplace" 
hyperlink; then follow "State of the Workplace © 2003" hyperlink). 
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sands of companies are already doing-granting all employees domestic­
partner benefits. But to keep the mark's message focused on the most undis­
putable measure of equality, we have structured the license to retain ENDA's 
clarity. Paragraph 7 of the license expressly provides that the agreement 
"shall not be construed to require the provision of employee benefits to an 
individual for the benefit of the domestic partner of such individual." 
C. More Expansive Measures of Gay Friendliness 
Some readers might be thinking, "businesses already have a mark to 
signal employment policies that are fair to LGBT workers: the Human 
Rights Campaign Corporate Equality Index 1 00% mark." True enough. 
Since 2002, HRC has been administering the Corporate Equality Index 
(CEI), a 1 00-point system that rates corporate policies and actions toward 
the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender community.68 The CEI rates the 
Fortune 500 based upon the extent to which they: 
"Bar" discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in their primary 
written nondiscrimination policy. 
Include the words "gender identity" or "gender identity and/or expres­
sion" in their primary written nondiscrimination policy. 
Offer health insurance coverage to employees' same-sex domestic 
partners firm-wide; or provide cash compensation to employees to 
purchase health insurance for a domestic partner on their own. 
Officially recognize and support a gay, lesbian, bisexual, and 
trans gender employee resource group; or would support employees' 
forming a GLBT employee-resource group, if some expressed interest, 
by providing space and other resources; or have a firm-wide diversity 
council or working group whose mission specifically includes GLBT 
diversity. 
Offer diversity training that includes sexual orientation and/or gender 
identity and expression in the workplace. 
Engage in respectful and appropriate marketing to the gay, lesbian, 
bisexual, and transgender community and/or provide support through 
their corporate foundation or otherwise to GLBT health, educational, 
political, or community organizations or events. 
Engage in corporate action that would undermine the goal of equal 
rights for gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender people.69 
68. Among its many advocacy activities on behalf of LGBT citizens, HRC administers the 
Corporate Equality Index through the Human Rights Campaign Foundation. See Human Rights 
Campaign Foundation, Corporate Equality Index, http://www.hrc.org (follow "Publications" hyper­
link; then follow "Corporate Equality Index" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 19, 2006). 
69. HRC acquired "glvlndex" in 2001 and subsequently renamed it the HRC Corporate 
Equality Index survey. See Human Rights Campaign Foundation, CEI Non-Responders, 
http://www.hrc.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Work_Life/Get_Informed2/Corporate_Equality_Index 
/Non_Responders/CEI_Non-Responders.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2006). 
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HRC uses its criteria to rate the companies on a 1 00-point scale, so that 
a company can achieve a relatively high score even if it cannot certify that it 
complies with all of the seven standards. Companies that achieve a score of 
1 00% can use a "Corporate Equality Index 1 00 Percent" service mark on 
their products. Several companies, including American Airlines, Ford Mo­
tors, and PepsiCo, are HRC-mark licensees. 
The Corporate Equality Index is an important and powerful measure of 
corporate responsibility to the LGBT community and its allies. The CEI has 
helped to move us to a point at which more than ninety-two percent of the 
Fortune 500 give their employees protection against sexual orientation dis­
crimination. 70 But in some important ways, the CEI is distinct from the Fair 
Employment mark. 
The HRC 1 00% mark is both more and less ambitious than the Fair Em­
ployment mark. It is less ambitious because it does not legally prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientaticn. The HRC mark requires 
the employer to include sexual orientation in its nondiscrimination policy, 
but in many jurisdictions these policies do not constitute legally binding 
promises-especially with regard to applicants who are never hired (and 
therefore not in privity with the employer).71 In these jurisdictions, a nondis­
crimination policy is "cheap talk" because employees and third parties gain 
no means to enforce violations of the policy. By transforming such policies 
into promises, the Fair Employment mark has enforcement "teeth" that the 
HRC 1 00% mark may lack, at least in some jurisdictions. 
It is important to note, however, that even if the CEI does not by its 
terms ensure the level of ex ante protection guaranteed by the Fair Employ­
ment mark, the HRC does engage in quite vigorous ex post policing of the 
CEI. Teams of researchers at HRC scour litigation databases looking for 
actions involving employment discrimination by survey respondents. HRC 
then analyzes the firms' actions and positions in litigation to determine 
whether the firms are treating the cases with sufficient seriousness. This 
follow-up by HRC gives the survey respondents' nondiscrimination policies 
greater credibility. If an employer sought to defend allegations of employ­
ment discrimination on the ground that the "at-will" employment doctrine 
permitted its discriminatory action, HRC would respond with a lower CEI 
score the following year. The Fair Employment mark would reinforce this 
trend by giving additional, ex ante contractual teeth to firms' representa­
tions. When a firm violates its policy, HRC can punish it after the fact by 
lowering its CEI score, but if that same behavior breaks a Fair Employment 
mark promise, the victim can sue. 
70. Equality Forum, Fortune 500 Nondiscrimination Project, http://www.equalityforum.org/ 
fortune500/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2005) (showing that 92.2 percent of the Fortune 500 give protection 
from sexual orientation discrimination in employment; site shows compliant and noncompliant 
firms by state and sector of the economy). 
7 1 .  It still might be plausible to argue that an applicant entered into a preemployment con­
tract-in exchange for the applicant's applying, the employer implicitly or explicitly promised not 
to discriminate. 
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On several dimensions the 100% mark is more demanding than the Fair 
Employment mark. The CEI measures protection for gender identity and 
expression (omitted from the Fair Employment mark). The CEI also rewards 
the provision of domestic partner health benefits and encourages a variety of 
activities to support LGBT workers. 
As noted above, there is no structural factor requiring an employer to 
choose either the CEI mark or the Fair Employment mark. The two marks 
move in consistent directions. It might be appropriate to have more than one 
mark to allow employers to signal different qualities. For the companies that 
work most progressively to ensure fairness to LGBT workers, the CEI repre­
sents a gold standard for corporate policymaking. But in a commercial 
environment where consumers and potential employees must sift through 
complex and sometimes conflicting information about companies and prod­
ucts, we do think there is some virtue in the Fair Employment mark's 
simplicity. 72 That simplicity achieves distinct and valuable signaling, even in 
a world with the CEI. The Fair Employment mark is intentionally structured 
so that the public need not trust our bona tides or vigor in auditing compli­
ance. The mark empowers employees and applicants to vindicate a clear 
wrong: discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. 
A specific criterion on the CEI scale that might cause concern is the one 
measuring the company's support for an LGBT employee group. The CEI 
survey makes clear that an employer can "support" an LGBT employee 
group in a variety of ways: by certifying that such a group exists and provid­
ing one contact person involved in the group, by funding the group's 
activities, or by providing meeting space. Some employers may be too small 
to support such a group, lacking a critical mass of openly LGBT employees. 
The CEI standards recognize this fact when they provide, as an alternative to 
support for an LGBT employee group, that a company could establish a sen­
ior level diversity council. Even the smallest company could fulfill this 
requirement. 
Note, however, that the requirement of an LGBT employee group goes 
beyond the command of equality. It does more than place sexual orientation 
on par with race and gender in employment protections. LGBT employee 
groups and diversity councils are forms of affirmative action, as they repre­
sent affirmative steps to recruit and retain LGBT employees and make the 
workplace more comfortable for them. Our point is not to accept the equa­
tion of affirmative action with other forms of discrimination, but only to 
suggest that any requirement vulnerable to the "special rights" canard may 
weaken the mark's signal, at least for some consumers. A nondiscrimination 
requirement should never be removed, but remedial affirmative action and 
other forms of outreach might appropriately be subject to an ultimate sunset. 
72. Our conclusion is tempered by our presumption of qualified deference to HRC, a highly 
credible and effective gay rights advocacy organization. In Straightforward, we suggest that individ­
ual supporters of gay rights-especially heterosexuals-should give qualified deference to gay 
rights organizations. See AYRES & BROWN, supra note 25, at 1 89-92 (2005). The Human Rights 
Campaign has done and continues to do heroic work in the struggle for equal employment rights. 
Our first inclination is to defer to their views on these matters. 
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The CEI requirement of charitable contributions to LGBT organizations, 
sponsorship of LGBT events, or advertisements in LGBT publications might 
similarly draw the "special rights" criticism from some consumers and third 
parties. The financial factor could even strain the public's trust of HRC, be­
cause if contributions to HRC itself can satisfy this requirement, then HRC 
as an organization would become self-interested in the transaction.73 
We have no reason to believe that HRC has acted in a self-interested 
manner in administering the CEI. Indeed, given the hostility that often meets 
initiatives promoting fairness for LGBT people, we find it necessary to 
make clear that our proposal should not be read as a criticism of HRC or the 
CEI. HRC has done great work in securing employment protections for 
LGBT workers. We stress the differences between the CEI and the Fair 
Employment mark only to demonstrate the distinct features of the mark. 
The Fair Employment mark is designed to steer clear of any criticisms 
related to "special rights" or self-dealing. Since we do not collect a licensing 
fee, licensees and the public need not worry about whether we will be op­
portunistic with regard to certification or litigation. We certify only that a 
licensee has signed the license, and then we retire from the scene. There is 
no hint or possibility of personal profit, and thus our mark avoids the ap­
pearance of self-dealing. 
We have considered whether the Fair Employment mark ought to incor­
porate a scoring system similar to the CEL It would be possible to devise a 
mark that includes a numeral signaling the company's rating on an index 
similar to the CEI. Thus, for example, cereals made by General Mills might 
bear a label reading "FE=9," while cereals made by Kellogg would rate only 
"FE=7."74 This difference might provide some consumers a reason to buy 
Cheerios rather than Rice Krispies. But the example of General Mills and 
Kellogg suggests a reason not to combine the mark with a numerical rating. 
The difference between a "9" and a "7" may be insufficiently transparent to 
convey this difference to consumers. 
For pragmatic reasons, we reject these varying signals. Consumers 
would not only have difficulty understanding a ratings system, but they 
73. The Rev. Jesse Jackson and his civil rights organization, the Rainbow/PUSH Coalition, 
have been subject to this sort of critique. Some observers have accused them of giving companies 
charged with racial discrimination a sort of absolution in exchange for large donations to PUSH. See 
generally KENNETH TIMMERMAN, SHAKEDOWN: EXPOSING THE REAL JESSE JACKSON (2003); Marc 
Morano, PUSH Comes to Shove: Jesse Jackson 's Empire Crumbles, CNSNEWS.COM, Jan. 15 ,  2002, 
available at http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2002/l / l  4/ 170935. shtml. 
74. General Mills could boast its higher Fair Employment rating because it has included 
sexual orientation in its nondiscrimination policy, offers domestic partner health insurance benefits, 
and has an LGBT Employee Group. These three factors-a nondiscrimination policy that covers 
sexual orientation, health benefits for domestic partners, and an LGBT employee group-are the 
easiest, most objective criteria to monitor, and General Mills has fulfilled all of them. Kellogg, on 
the other hand, offers only spotty domestic partner health benefits, which suppresses its score. See 
Human Rights Campaign Foundation, Profile: General Mills Inc., http://www.hrc.org/ 
Template.cfm?Section=Search_the_Database&Template=/CustomSource/WorkNet/srch_dtl.cfm& 
srchtype=QS&searchid=l &orgid=l 244 (last visited Apr. 20, 2005); Human Rights Campaign Foun­
dation, Profile: Kellogg Co., http:www.hrc.org/Template/cfm?Section=Search_the_Database& 
Template=ICustomSource/WorkNet/srch_dtl.cfm&srchtype--QS&searched= I &orgid= 14 7 1  (last visited 
Jan. 29, 2006). 
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might also not equally endorse the varied commands of the CEI program. 
Instead, we have chosen-at least initially-to have a much simpler and 
limited coverage that is targeted at eradicating the core wrong, intentional 
disparate treatment on the basis of sexual orientation. To this end, we pro­
pose that the mark should be licensed only to companies that privately 
promise not to violate the ENDA commands of nondiscrimination. 
One way to resolve the differences between the CEI approach and ours 
is through a kind of harmonization. HRC has already announced plans to 
update its index criteria in 2006. It will give increased weight to equal bene­
fits, workplace policies for transgender employees, and diversity training. 
The simplest way to harmonize the CEI and the Fair Employment mark 
would be for HRC, as part of these updates, to make its criteria legally bind­
ing. 75 By changing just two words, HRC might accomplish the major goal of 
the Fair Employment mark-granting employees private causes of action. 
All it would need to do is measure the extent to which the companies "bar 
employment discrimination based on sexual orientation by including the 
words 'sexual orientation' in their priHutry ·.vritten legally binding nondis­
crimination or EEO policy." This change would substantially undercut the 
need for a separate Fair Employment mark. 76 
Harmonization is a two way street. It would also be possible for the Fair 
Employment mark to evolve so that it follows the contours of the HRC mark 
more closely. While our initial license only commits companies to the non­
discrimination mandates of ENDA, subsequent editions of the mark might 
encompass more far-reaching goals. For example, once ENDA is enacted, 
the license would be wholly redundant with the mandated federal right. At 
that point in time, it might be appropriate to require that licensees provide 
domestic-partnership benefits (at least to same-sex partners, who are denied 
the option to marry civilly). Alternatively, it might be appropriate to add 
gender identity and expression to the covered protections. In the spirit of 
incrementalism that informs much of our thinking,77 we endorse the possi­
bility of evolving rights. But we should be careful not to impose an ever-
75. The same point could be made about another recent HRC innovation: the Congressional 
Non-Discrimination Pledge. HRC, along with the Gender Public Advocacy Coalition and other allied 
organizations, has secured "commitments from members of Congress not to discriminate based on 
sexual orientation and gender identity and expression in their personal offices." Human Rights Cam­
paign Foundation, Members of 108th Congress With Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity 
and Expression Inclusive Non-Discrimination Pledges, http://www.hrc.org/Content/NavigationMenu/ 
HRC/Get_Informed/Issues/Workplace_Discrimination/Background_Information4/Pledge_Project.htm 
(last visited Apr. 22, 2005) (emphasis added). To make the pledge, members of Congress must sign the 
following statement: 'The sexual orientation and gender identity or expression of an individual is not a 
consideration in the hiring, promoting or terminating of an employee in my office." Id. We are thrilled 
to see that 2 1  Senators and 1 24 Representatives ( 15  Republicans, 1 28 Democrats) have signed the 
pledge. Id. Again, however, we worry that "statements" and "commitments" fall short of enforceable 
promises. The symbolic value is great, but for an LGBT employee who actually suffers discrimination, 
the pledge may prove toothless. 
76. The only question would be whether the additional "special rights" features chilled ac­
ceptance to the point where it might be worthwhile to have a separate mark that solely prohibited 
discrimination. 
77. See AYRES & BROWN, supra note 25, at 84. 
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escalating set of duties on employers. Corporations will be chary of the 
mark if they can predict that it will become increasingly burdensome (be­
cause there will be costs in adverse publicity if in the future they choose to 
discontinue their use of the mark). HRC appears to recognize the impor­
tance of such stability. In the 2005 survey, they gave firms explicit, written 
notice of changes scheduled to take effect in 2006. 
D. Covering Affiliate Corporations 
Finally, it might be appropriate to require users of the mark to certify 
that affiliated corporations-particularly major suppliers-have also agreed 
to be bound by the nondiscrimination mandate of the mark. Other labeling 
schemes have dealt more rigorously than our license has with the problem 
of suppliers. For example, the "leaping bunny" mark of the Coalition for 
Consumer Information on Cosmetics (CCIC) certifies that both the manu­
facturer and the ingredient suppliers for marked cosmetics and household 
products do not perform tests on animals.78 
In order to ensure a critical level of participation, we have crafted the 
Fair Employment license only to apply to the licensee's own employment 
practices. Again, this mimics the coverage of ENDA itself, because corpora­
tions are not responsible for discriminatory practices of their suppliers. Of 
course, one danger of this is that an essentially empty "gay friendly" shell 
could be devised to bear the label, while the entire manufacturing process is 
conducted by companies that discriminate against gay, lesbian, and bisexual 
employees. But we find it unlikely that corporate forms will be manipulated 
because of the possibility of disparate-treatment liability, and we are reluc­
tant to require an adopting company to enforce nondiscrimination up the 
supply chain (at least in the first iteration of the mark). 
E. Group Enforcement 
The potential victims of discrimination are the most obvious group of 
enforcers. The certification license expressly empowers this group by nam­
ing the corporation's employees and applicants as third-party beneficiaries 
and clothing them with the same kind of private action rights they would 
have under ENDA: ''The Licensee and Licensor intend that these third-party 
beneficiaries will have the right to sue the Licensee for any breach of this 
agreement and have a legal right to the same remedies (including damages 
and injunctive relief) to which they would be entitled if ENDA were in ef­
fect." Gay and lesbian employees will have the strongest incentives to police 
the licensee's conduct, and the cheapest access to information regarding 
violations. Therefore, using the licensing agreement to create rights of ac­
tion in the employees-who are, after all, the intended beneficiaries of the 
whole arrangement-is eminently sensible. 
78. The Coalition for Consumer Information on Cosmetics, Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.Ieapingbunny.org/faq.htm (last visited May 2 1 ,  2004). 
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For current or potential employees to assist in enforcement efforts, they 
must know about the mark and the rights it guarantees. Some licensees 
might use the mark to promote their products with consumers but not alert 
employees to its meaning. We doubt that this is a serious concern, however. 
As argued below, many employers will use the mark as a tool to recruit po­
tential employees who are gay, lesbian, or bisexual. Moreover, gay and 
lesbian employees have good incentives to learn about the nondiscrimina­
tion policies of their actual or potential employers. The names of all 
licensees will be publicly available on the Internet. Gay rights advocacy 
groups such as HRC are likely to continue to provide information about the 
policies of individual employers. Some employers may not be motivated to 
distribute this information to employees on their own. But gay workers are 
likely to learn very quickly when their employer has chosen to start marking 
its product. 
Certification marks usually involve the licensor as an active monitor in 
certifying the compliance of the mark user. The mark users pay license fees 
to the licensor to cover these monitoring expenses. But we have opted for a 
much more decentralized structure that obviates the need for monitoring by 
the licensor and the payment of licensing fees. The licensor merely certifies 
that the licensee has promised not to discriminate. This certification does 
not require licensor effort, because the very act of validly using the mark 
constitutes the promise of nondiscrimination. The employees of the licensee 
are then left (just as under ENDA) to do the substantive work of enforcing 
the underlying promise. 
Far more complex enforcement schemes than the Fair Employment 
mark have succeeded with regard to other certification marks. For example, 
consider the "Orthodox Union" emblem (a letter "U" inside a larger circle 
or letter "O") certifying that a product is kosher.79 The Orthodox Union cer­
tification service employs a staff of "over 1,000 rabbinic coordinators, 
kashruth supervisors, food chemists and support personnel."80 It certifies 
"250,000 brand names, hotels, restaurants, services and 2,505 companies in 
54 countries around the globe."81 Substantial paperwork and close attention 
to detail are required of companies using the OU emblem.82 In contrast, the 
Fair Employment mark is a model of procedural licensing simplicity. 
An alternative way of supplementing private employee enforcement 
would be to specify that particular gay rights advocacy organizations would 
have standing as third-party beneficiaries to enforce the agreement. Such 
79. Orthodox Union, OU Kosher Policy Information, http://www.ou.org/kosher/policy.htm 
(last visited May 2 1 ,  2004). 
80. Orthodox Union, About the Orthodox Union, http://www.ou.org/about/ou.htm (last vis­
ited May 2 1 ,  2004). 
8 1 .  Id. 
82. The website of the Orthodox Union canies a short article that illustrates the complexity of 
compliance. See Orthodox Union, ls Your Kosher Program Running Smoothly?, http://www.ou.org/ 
kosher/behindsymbol/kosherprog.htm (last visited May 2 1 ,  2004). 
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organizations have standing to enforce other civil rights laws,83 and extend­
ing such enforcement powers might be particularly appropriate when 
government enforcement is not forthcoming. Indeed, if an organization such 
as the Human Rights Campaign or its Worknet division were to act as the 
licensor itself, it would have direct standing as a certifier to ensure that its 
licensees were complying with the promises of the license. Even if HRC did 
not act as licensor, it might be listed as a third-party beneficiary of the 
agreement, again creating the right to enforce the standards of fairness in 
employment contained in the agreement. 
The power of advocacy groups is also related to the question of auditing. 
To facilitate enforcement by agencies and organizations, the licensing 
agreement could require the licensee company to permit "testing"-what 
some might call "deceptive audits"-by which people who do not really 
intend to take jobs or remain in jobs pose as applicants or employees to test 
the company's compliance with the licensing agreement. Testing is used 
regularly in making sure that minorities are not discriminated against in fed­
eral housing programs. States also use testing to judge stores' compliance 
with laws against the purchase of alcohol or cigarettes by minors. Similarly, 
here testers could apply for a posted job opening and present themselves as 
openly bisexual, gay, or lesbian. They could ask about discrimination poli­
cies, domestic partner benefits, or LGBT employee groups. They might even 
take the jobs temporarily, without a bona fide intention of working for the 
company, just to see whether the policies are actually followed once em­
ployees enter the company. 
Corporate consent to potential auditing is important because it can re­
duce the risk that the auditor will be sued by the corporation. In one case, a 
company subject to similar testing sued and obtained a large jury verdict 
against the testing entity. In Food Lion v. Capital Cities, Food Lion brought 
a tort action when ABC broadcast videotape of unwholesome food handling 
practices.84 The videotape had been obtained by ABC reporters who gained 
employment in Food Lion supermarkets by misrepresentation.85 The plaintiff 
alleged fraud, employee disloyalty, and unfair trade practices. The jury re­
turned a verdict for the plaintiff, awarding $1,402 in compensatory damages 
and over $5 million in punitive damages, which the trial judge reduced to 
$315,000 through remittitur.86 On appeal, the court rejected Food Lion's 
fraud claim, because the reporters were at-will employees for an indefinite 
period, and Food Lion could show no reliance on their misrepresentations in 
training them and paying their wages.87 With respect to the claims of em­
ployee disloyalty, however, the court held that the reporters intended to act 
83. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372-79 (1982) (giving standing to civil-
rights organization to sue as fair-housing plaintiff). 
84. Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 923, 927 (M.D.N.C. 1997). 
85. Id. 
86. Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 5 10  (4th Cir. 1 999). 
87. Id. at 5 1 3-14. 
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against the interests of the plaintiff and were liable in tort. 88 The reporters' 
disloyalty also caused the reporters to exceed the consent Food Lion granted 
them to enter plaintiff 's premises; the reporters therefore committed tres­
pass.89 The court rejected Food Lion's claim that misrepresentations on the 
job applications alone could vitiate Food Lion's consent.90 
To avoid anything resembling the Food Lion case, the entity licensing 
the Fair Employment mark might include in the licensing agreement a 
clause making clear that use of the mark is conditioned upon consent to ran­
dom testing. This could create incentives for licensees to comply with the 
mark's requirements, and in the event testing did occur, preempt any claims 
of fraud or trespass they might bring arising from the testing. 
Although there are strong arguments for empowering advocacy groups 
like HRC both to audit and to bring suit against licensees, we have chosen, 
in the spirit of incrementalism, to maintain a narrow set of potential plain­
tiffs and enforcement tools for the initial version of the license. Real 
progress can be made just by endowing the direct victims of discrimination 
with a power to sue. And to our minds, the costs of scaring away potential 
licensees could outweigh these concrete benefits if the licensing scheme 
becomes too ambitious or complex. By expressly waiving any right to sue 
for violations of the nondiscrimination promise, our license agreement 
makes clear that our attitudes toward enforcement are inconsequential. Our 
transparent passivity is one less thing for employers to worry about when 
deciding whether to commit to the license. 
A more modest alternative would be to use a group enforcement system 
as a substitute for individual enforcement. Instead of our proposed system of 
private causes of action with damages and no auditing, one could instead 
have a system of vigorous auditing and no damages. Under this alternative, 
loss of the mark would be the only consequence of discriminating. Potential 
licensees would not have to worry about potential dollar damages for violat­
ing the nondiscrimination promise because the only consequence of such a 
finding would be loss of the mark. As a remedial matter, this alternative is 
close to the structure of the HRC 100% mark. The HRC takes responsibility 
for judging compliance and the consequences of negative assessments are 
purely informational-loss of the mark and negative publicity. While this 
represents a plausible incremental alternative, we prefer replicating ENDA 
rights with legally binding causes of action-at least to the extent that we 
can induce a substantial number of employers to sign. The next Section will 
argue that it is plausible to expect that a substantial number of employers 
may be willing to sign. 
88. Id. at 5 1 5-16. 
89. Id. at 5 1 6-19. 
90. Id. at 5 18. 
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III. MARKETING NONDISCRIMINATION 
This Section takes on the hard question of why a company might be will­
ing to sign up for potential legal liability. One response to the mark is that it is 
a nonstarter because no competent general counsel would ever allow a com­
pany to volunteer for liability. But this is surely wrong as a matter of a priori 
theory. Every contract--every promise, every warranty, every representation 
of fact-volunteers for potential legal liability. Business is the art of calcu­
lated volunteering and risk-taking, and the crucial empirical question is 
whether the benefits of licensing the mark will ever outweigh the costs. 
This Section explores the potential benefits of licensing. In large part these 
will be the marketing benefits of being seen as a non-discriminator. But the 
Section is also about marketing in a second sense. We are also interested in 
identifying the set of employers to whom we might be able to market the li­
censing agreement. This is not just a theoretical exercise. The publication of 
this Article kicks off our campaign to cover 100,000 employees by the end of 
2007. This Section attempts to develop a positive theory that identifies the 
conditions under which an employer's benefits are likely to outweigh its costs 
of adoption. We will ultimately identify a number of factors that suggest that 
the most likely signatories are employers that 
are located in one of the seventeen states with statutes that already grant 
private rights of action for sexual orientation discrimination; 
have independently included sexual orientation in their nondiscrimina­
tion policy or have publicly announced support for ENDA; 
sell to government entities requiring contractors not to discriminate on 
the basis of sexual orientation; or 
have smaller market shares. 
The first two characteristics describe employers that face smaller addi­
tional costs of signing, while the last (smaller market share) describes an 
employer for which we predict the net gains in demand will be particularly 
high. 
A. The Incremental Costs 
As an initial matter, it is important to get a handle on the magnitude of 
the potential litigation risk for companies that become licensees. Earlier we 
emphasized that the experience of licensees themselves would provide valu­
able information on the likely litigation rates that one might see under 
ENDA. But it turns out that the United States General Accounting Office 
(GAO) has already compiled valuable information on the number of com­
plaints filed under state statutes that prohibit employment discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation.91 In 2000, the GAO analyzed the claim rates 
9 1 .  U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PuBL'N No. GAO/OGC-00-27R, SEXUAL-
ORIENTATION-BASED EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: STATES' EXPERIENCE WITH STATUTORY PRO­
HIBITIONS SINCE 1 997 (2000). 
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in eleven states with statutory prohibitions.92 The study reported the number 
of claims of sexual orientation discrimination made in each state in each 
year. But the study failed to analyze the rate of claiming relative to the num­
ber of employees in each state.93 When we combine the GAO claim data 
with information from the Bureau of Labor Statistics on yearly levels of 
state employment, we can more directly assess the incremental litigation 
risk created by prohibitions on sexual orientation discrimination.94 
TABLE I :  
ANALYSIS OF LITIGATION RATES AND EXPECTED COSTS 
OF STATE PROHIBITIONS 
Gay % of Gay 
Employees Employees Employees Cost Per 
Per Per Filing Cost Per Gay 
Complaint Complaint Complaints Emplovee Emolovee 
Averaoe 59,739 1792 0.06% $1 .67 $55.80 
Maximum 294,550 8,837 0.18% $5.32 $177.22 
Minimum 18,809 564 0.01% $0.34 $1 1 .32 
Standard 55,309 1 ,569 0.04% $1 .23 $41 .09 
Division 
Notes: Complaint Data taken from GAO Report, supra note 91 ;  Employment Data taken from 
Bureau of Labor Statistics Report, infra note 94. In the end, there were sixty-seven state-year 
observations. "Gay Employee" calculations assume three percent of employees are gay or 
lesbian. "Cost" calculations assume that an employer expects the average complaint to cost 
$100,000. 
Table 1 shows the results of the analysis. We find that overall the rate of 
complaining is relatively low. Averaging over the sixty-seven state-year ob­
servations in the data, we find almost 60,000 workers for every sexual 
orientation complaint filed. The second column recalculates the complaint 
92. Id. at 7 (these were the states that had claim data available). 
93. It instead calculated the proportion of state discrimination complaints that were based on 
claims of sexual orientation. Under this analysis, one finds that Vermont experienced a higher pro­
portion of sexual orientation complaints than other states. But this might be an artifact of Vermont 
having fewer racial and ethnic minority workers than other states. It does not tell us about the ex­
pected additional risk that employers face in Vermont because of the employment protections for 
gay workers. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW 
869 (2d ed. 2004); see also William Rubenstein, Do Gay Rights Laws Matter? An Empirical As­
sessment, 75 So. CAL. L. REv. 65 (200 1 )  (arguing that, assuming lesbians and gay men comprise 
five percent of the population, rate of sexual orientation discrimination complaints roughly parallels 
rate of sex discrimination complaints). William Eskridge and Nan Hunter have noted that the GAO 
data "raise as many questions [as] they answer." ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra, at 894. For example, 
the number of complaints of sexual orientation discrimination does not correspond to total popula­
tions (California had actual numbers similar to Massachusetts, which had only one-fifth as many 
residents, while Wisconsin, the state whose population is closest to Massachusetts, had fewer than 
one-half the number of complaints filed). See id. at 869. 
94. See U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment, Hours, and 
Earnings from the Current Employment Statistics Survey, http://data.bls.gov/PDQ/ 
outside.jsp?survey=sm (last visited Feb. 2 1 ,  2006), for the number-of-employees figures. The em­
ployment number used is the total number of non-agricultural employees for a given state in a given 
year. Employment numbers are given on a monthly basis, so we used the average monthly employ­
ment for our annual data. 
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rate in terms of gay employees-arbitrarily assuming that three percent of 
all employees are gay or lesbian.95 The analysis suggests that in an average 
year only one out of every 1792 gay employees filed a complaint. In other 
words, the probability that a gay employee will file a sexual orientation 
charge in any year is six-tenths of one percent. 
To give an idea of the economic costs to employers of such complaints, 
Table 1 also reports the average costs per employee, assuming that the ex­
pected average costs for an employer of responding to a complaint (including 
costs of diverted attention, attorney fees, legal damages, and so forth) is 
$100,000. This is a ballpark estimate (possibly generous) that is only an at­
tempt to measure the probable magnitude of the costs of this new type of 
liability. Table 1 suggests that the overall costs to date have been low. The 
average cost of these laws per employee is less than $2 per year ($1.67). 
The final column of Table 1 calculates the expected annual costs per gay 
employee. Here we see a more substantial average cost: about $56 per year. 
On net, for each additional year a statute has been in effect, the expected 
annual cost per employee rises by 9.7 cents.96 
This analysis suggests that the state statutes have not substantially in­
creased the overall wage bill. Measured on a per-employee or a per-gay­
employee basis, it is hard to think that the costs of responding to litigation 
complaints are driving employer resistance to making binding nondiscrimi-
• 
• 97 nation prormses. 
Concerns about added litigation expense provide an even weaker excuse 
for employers in places that prohibit sexual orientation discrimination in 
employment by state statute. There are currently seventeen states (including 
the District of Columbia) that legislatively prohibit such discrimination.98 
95. See Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Competitive Federalism and the Legislative Incentives to 
Recognize Same-Sex Marriage, 68 So. CAL. L. REv. 745, 776-79 ( 1995) (conservatively adopting 
three percent, based upon surveys and other social scientific research). The point of this exercise is 
to give an estimate for the magnitude of the rate. Since the second column is merely the first column 
multiplied by the proportion of workers who are gay, readers can easily calculate claim rates based 
on alternative assumptions. 
96. An Ordinary Least Squares regression of the annual costs per employee on a variety of 
factors suggests that the general cost is decreasing over time, but for each state, costs increase the 
longer the law is in effect. The regression controlled for "year of the observation;' "years law has 
been in effect in this state" and ten state dummy variables. The background data and analysis is 
publicly downloadable at http://islandia.law.yale.edu/ayres/Analysis%20of%20GA0%20Data% 
20Concem%20Sexual%200rtn%20Disc%20Statutes.xls. 
97. We will consider whether the threat of consumer boycotts provides an alternative cost 
basis. Infra Section ill.C. 
98. According to the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, 47% of the U.S. population lives 
in jurisdictions that have adopted nondiscrimination laws. This includes 38% who live in states with 
such laws; another 9% are covered by city or county law. See SEAN CAHILL, THE GLASS NEARLY 
HALF FULL: 47% OF U.S. POPULATION LIVES IN JURISDICTION WITH SEXUAL ORIENTATION NON­
DISCRIMINATION LAW 3-4 (2005), http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/GlassHalfFull.pdf. The 
states are California, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Rhode Island, Ver­
mont, Washington, and Wisconsin. See Human Rights Campaign Foundation, Non-Discrimination 
Laws: State-by-State, http://www.hrc.org (follow "Laws in Your State" hyperlink; then follow 
"Statewide Anti-discrimination Laws and Policies" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 22, 2006). 
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Adopting the mark exposes employers in these states to no additional liabil­
ity, because they are independently amenable to suit under the state 
analogue to the license. Indeed, the laws in many of these states are more 
expansive than the Fair Employment mark duties because they include the 
possibility of punitive damages, expose employers to potential disparate­
impact claims, or have been interpreted to cover gender identity and expres­
sion. 99 The marginal benefits of protecting workers in these states with the 
Fair Employment mark are greatly reduced, but so too are the marginal costs 
of providing this contractual coverage. 
A similar argument applies to employers that have independently in­
cluded sexual orientation within their nondiscrimination policy. Employers 
that have already committed themselves not to discriminate on the basis of 
sexual orientation have little to lose in the way of legal liability by signing 
the Fair Employmentlicense. But the issue is complicated by the uncertain 
legal effect of nondiscrimination policies. It might come as a surprise to 
some readers, but in some jurisdictions the majestic language of "policies" 
does not give rise to legally binding "promises." Employers that include 
sexual orientation in their nondiscrimination policies have been known to 
tum around and claim that they have no legal duty not to discriminate-and 
they sometimes win. 
Cases considering the contractual enforceability of nondiscrimination 
provisions in employee handbooks and company policies follow a somewhat 
similar structure. They start with the at-will presumption, namely that an 
employment relationship is presumed to be terminable at will on both sides. 
Sometimes, courts go on to rule that handbooks or policies can create en­
forceable obligations (typically by establishing specific procedures or 
criteria for termination). In a smaller number of cases, the courts consider 
whether the specific nondiscrimination provision at issue is enforceable. 
Some courts have held that even very clear language in an employee 
handbook (e.g., "No employee shall be dismissed without just cause") was 
unenforceable under contract because it did not meet the traditional re­
quirements of contract formation. 100 For example, in Joachim v. AT&T 
99. See, e.g., Assemb. B. 2900, 2004 Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004) (amending existing labor 
and employment nondiscrimination provisions in California law to be consistent with the nondiscrimi­
nation provisions of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), including prohibitions on 
discrimination on the basis of gender identity); Assemb. B. 196, 2003 Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003) 
(amending Fair Employment and Housing law to include gender identity and gender status); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 10:5-1 (West 2002); N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 290-300 (McKinney 2005); see also Equality 
California, AB 2900: The Omnibus Labor and Employment Non-Discrimination Act, 
http://www.eqca.org/atf/cf/ { 687DF34F-6480-4BCD-9C2B-l F33FD8El 294 }/ AB_2900_factsheet.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 25, 2005); New Jersey Office of the Attorney General, Division of Civil Rights: Em­
ployment, http://www.state.nj .us/lps/dcr/employ.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2005) (explaining that the 
New Jersey Law Against Discrimination includes disparate impact claims). See generally National Gay 
& Lesbian Task Force, Scope of Explicitly Transgender-lnclusive Anti-Discrimination Laws, 
http://www.transgenderlaw.org/ndlaws/ngltftlpichart.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2005) (listing states and 
towns with employment protections for transgendered people). 
100. Joachim v. AT&T Info. Sys., 793 F.2d 1 13 (5th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (quoting Rey­
nolds Mfg. Co. v. Mendoza, 644 S.W.2d 536, 539 (Tex. App. 1 982)) (holding that although AT&T's 
personnel handbook said that sexual orientation would not be used as a basis for job discrimination 
or termination and plaintiff alleged that he was terminated because he was gay, "employee hand-
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Information Systems, the Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment against a 
plaintiff who invoked the employer's handbook when complaining of sexual 
orientation discrimination, because the court concluded that the handbook 
did not form a contract 101 
The issue is complicated because the legal enforceability of nondis­
crimination policies (and employee handbooks more generally) is in flux. 
Some courts have held that nondiscrimination provisions can give rise to 
enforceable obligations. 102 For example, Albertus Magnus College was un­
able to persuade a federal district court in 2000 that its nondiscrimination 
policy was not an enforceable contract under state law. 103 
Arizona has an open-ended test that relies heavily on particular facts to 
determine whether handbook language is enforceable. This test is motivated 
by the policy that if "an employer does choose to issue a policy statement, in 
a manual or otherwise, and, by its language or by the employer's actions, 
encourages reliance thereon, the employer cannot be free to only selectively 
books 'constituted no more than general guidelines,' and did not create a contractual right in the 
employees"); Johnson v. Nat'! Beef Packing Co., 551 P.2d 779, 781-82 (Kan. 1 976) (holding that 
although company policy manual said, "No employee shall be dismissed without just cause," "[i]t 
was only a unilateral expression of company policy and procedures. Its terms were not bargained for 
by the parties and any benefits conferred by it were mere gratuities. Certainly, no meeting of the 
minds was evidenced by the defendant's unilateral act of publishing company policy."); Poree v. 
Lakewind E. Apartments, Civ. A. No. 93-3466, 1 994 WL 705428, at *2 (E.D. La. Dec. 1 5 ,  1994) 
(deciding that although employee handbook described a company policy of nondiscrimination and 
plaintiff alleged racial discrimination in violation of that policy, complaint was dismissed because 
"under Louisiana law. employee handbooks and personnel policy manuals do not in themselves 
create contractual rights between the employer and employee"); Hillie v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 
5 1 2  N.W.2d 358, 362 (Neb. 1994) (suggesting that any language in a handbook that reserves discre­
tion in the employer to (a) follow handbook procedures, or (b) fire the employee at will has effect of 
negating the existence of a contractual promise not to discriminate); Morosetti v. La. Land and 
Exploration Co., 564 A.2d 1 5 1 ,  153 (Pa. 1 989) (holding that when company circulated a severance 
pay policy, but later denied severance pay to several employees, there was no contract because a 
"company may indeed have a policy upon which they intend to act, given certain circumstances or 
events, but unless they communicate that policy as part of a definite offer of employment they are 
free to change as events may require"). 
1 0 1 .  See Joachim, 793 F.2d at 1 14. 
1 02. See, e.g., Black v. Baker Oil Tools, Inc., 107 F.3d 1457, 1 462 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding 
that "the promise that ' [a]ll relations and decisions pertaining to employment . . .  [and] terminations 
. . .  will be executed without regard to . . .  physical . . .  handicap . . .  .' is more than a mere 'vague 
assurance' or 'puffery,' but rather is a 'substantive restriction' on Baker Oil's ability to terminate its 
employees;" still, plaintiff must give consideration for this obligation); Adleta v. Gen. Elec., No. C-
1 -94-559, 1 996 WL 365783, at *4-5 (S.D. Ohio May 28, 1 996) ("Ohio appears to recognize a cause 
of action based upon a company's employment policies and procedures . . . .  In order to create a 
binding obligation, these representations must satisfy the traditional elements of contract Jaw­
namely, offer, acceptance and consideration."); Johnson v. Celsius Energy Co., No. C88-0227-1 3, 
1989 WL 260154, at *4 (D. Wyo. Feb. 28, 1989) (holding that when defendant's employee hand­
book "prohibits unlawful discrimination in all aspects and conditions of employment, including 
hiring, training, advancement, compensation, transfers, benefits, and terminations," such language 
negates employment at-will because it "creates an expectation on the part of an employee that [the 
provision] will be followed, inducing an employee to continue his employment," thereby negating 
"employment at-will") (emphasis added) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
1 03. Hartwig v. Albertus Magnus Coll., 93 F. Supp. 2d 200 (D. Conn. 2000); see also Durham 
Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, No. CIV.A.94-0801 ,  1 994 WL 447406, at *2-3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 1 994) 
(allowing employee's claim for breach of contract in sexual harassment suit to proceed), aff'd, 39 
F.3d 1 169 (3d Cir. 1 994 ). 
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abide by it. Having announced a policy, the employer may not treat it as 
illusory."104 California also has an open�ended, multifactor test examining 
"the totality of the circumstances . . . . Every case thus turns on its own 
facts."105 Massachusetts recently liberalized its test for determining whether 
company policies can give rise to contractual obligations, finding contrac­
tual language in a personnel manual because it "g[a]ve each employee the 
right to expect that she will be treated fairly" even though there was no ex­
press language guaranteeing discharge only for cause. 106 
Like the court in Arizona, the Massachusetts Supreme Court was driven 
by a desire for fundamental fairness: 
Management distributes personnel manuals because it is thought to be in 
its best interests to do so. Such a practice encourages employee security, 
satisfaction, and loyalty and a sense that every employee will be treated 
fairly and equally. Management expects that employees will adhere to the 
obligations that the manual sets forth. Courts recently have been reluctant 
to permit management to reap the benefits of a personnel manual and at the 
same time avoid promises freely made in the manual that employees rea­
sonably believed were part of their arrangement with the employer. 
Management voluntarily offers, and defines the terms of, any benefit set 
forth in its unbargained for personnel manual. The employees may have a 
reasonable expectancy that management will adhere to a manual's provi-
• 107 SJOnS. 
Although one federal court recently applied New Jersey law to rule non­
discrimination provisions unenforceable, the New Jersey Supreme Court has 
found handbook language enforceable when such language is definite and 
promissory (for example, "efforts will be made to take one or more of the 
following measures"). 108 This language even overrode an express disclaimer 
found elsewhere in the handbook. I()') 
The trend is moving away from requiring that the employee knew or re­
lied on the policy. 110 But courts still at times refuse to enforce 
I 04. Leikvold v. Valley View Cmty. Hosp., 688 P.2d 1 70, 1 74 (Ariz. 1 984). It should be noted 
that the employee's reliance is not necessary: it is "only one of several factors that are relevant in 
determining whether a particular policy was intended by the parties to modify an at-will agreement." 
Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem'l Hosp., 7 1 0  P.2d 1025, 1038 (Ariz. 1985). 
1 05. Guz v. Bechtel Nat'! ,  Inc., 8 P.3d 1 089, 1 10 1  (Cal. 2000) (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
106. O'Brien v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 664 N.E.2d 843, 849 (Mass. 1996). 
107. Id. at 848-49 (citation omitted). 
108. Geldreich v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 691 A.2d 423, 427 (N.J. 1997). 
109. Id. 
1 10. See, e.g., Marfia v. T.C. Ziraat Bankasi, 903 F. Supp. 463, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding 
the employer bank's "Non-Discrimination Policy" set forth in employee manual "surely can be read 
as a contractual limitation on the Bank's ability to discharge employees for discriminatory rea­
sons"). But see Gruver v. Ezon Prods., Inc., 763 F. Supp. 772, 774 (M.D. Pa. 1 99 1 )  (deciding that to 
establish contractual violation, employee must establish that harassment policy in personnel manual 
induced her employment). 
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nondiscrimination policies because they find that the policies were too 
vague or were not intended to be legally enforceable. 1 1 1  
Nondiscrimination policies may also fail to cover discrimination against 
rejected applicants. Since the rejected applicant is not hired, courts find no 
enforceable promise between the applicant and the employer. Applicants 
may argue that even if there is not an employment contract, there was an 
independent application contract whereby the applicant agreed to apply in 
return for the employer's promise to consider the application on a nondis­
criminatory basis. But courts might resurrect the requirement that the 
applicant knew and actually relied on the employer policy. In contrast, the 
Fair Employment mark license expressly grants rejected applicants rights to 
sue for discrimination. Rejected applicants thus represent another diver­
gence in potential legal risk even for employers that have included sexual 
orientation in their nondiscrimination policy. 
At the moment, the most that one can say is that employer nondiscrimi­
nation policies are only probabilistically enforceable. The magnitude of the 
probability depends upon the jurisdiction, whether the plaintiff is an appli­
cant or an employee, and details of how the policy was promulgated and 
presented. The Fair Employment mark represents a real gain for civil rights 
because it grants employees certain, as opposed to uncertain, rights to sue. 
The flip side of that coin, however, is that adopting the mark exposes some 
employers to higher potential liability. But since any employer that has vol­
untarily included sexual orientation in its nondiscrimination clause already 
faces some prospect of litigation, employers with inclusive nondiscrimina­
tion policies have relatively less to fear in terms of litigation from signing 
the license. 
Employer willingness-to-sign will of course tum on the benefits as well 
as these costs of signing. An analysis of litigation experience under state 
nondiscrimination statutes suggests that the litigation risk incurred by sign­
ing is in fact rather low. Moreover, employers that are bound by these state 
statutes or by their own voluntary policies of nondiscrimination have even 
less reason to resist committing to nondiscrimination. Employers may worry 
instead that adopting the mark will expose them to consumer boycotts that 
will reduce the demand for their products. We expressly address this con­
cern below. But the idea of added litigation risk is not a conversation 
stopper, if employers rationally assess its true magnitude. 
B. Risk Management 
Indeed, some employers might adopt the mark specifically to contain 
their potential liability for discrimination. This seems paradoxical, certainly: 
how could volunteering for liability ever reduce risk? The answer lies in the 
probabilistic enforcement currently given to nondiscrimination policies, as 
outlined above. As Ian Ayres and Richard Ober argue, "Increasingly courts 
1 1 1 . E.g., Blaise-Williams v. Sumitomo Bank Ltd., 592 N.Y.S.2d 4 1 ,  42 (App. Div. 1 993) (ruling 
that general anti discrimination statement in handbook was too vague to be enforceable). 
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are interpreting these nondiscrimination policies to be nondiscrimination 
promises. And when they do, they can impose open-ended forms of liabil­
ity."1 12 A move from "policies" to explicit "promises" is prudent because it 
can give employers more control over their potential exposure. As Ayres and 
Ober explain, a policy that prohibits "discrimination" might be interpreted 
to give employees both "disparate treatment" and "disparate impact" causes 
of action.1 13 The Fair Employment mark license contains potential liability 
by expressly limiting plaintiffs' theories of discrimination to disparate 
treatment. 
Similarly, the Fair Employment mark license gives employers proce­
dural safeguards. Employees are required to give notice of claims within 
180 days of the occurrence. Also important, the Fair Employment mark li­
cense can be used in conjunction with an arbitration clause in employee 
contracts. Instead of leaving potential liability up to the judicial coin toss of 
nondiscrimination policies, some employers might prefer to commit to non­
discrimination in a way that is enforceable and clearly defined. 
C. Satisfying Input Demand 
The next Section will assess the impact of the mark on consumer de­
mand. But before doing that, it is useful to assess the impact of the license 
on the flow of various inputs to a finn. Most basically, adopting the Fair 
Employment mark may be an attractive mechanism for recruiting gay and 
lesbian employees. Members of the gay community have strong incentives 
to learn about the nondiscrimination policies of prospective employers and, 
other things being equal, are likely to prefer employers that promise not to 
discriminate. Some employers may even prefer the mark to the passage of 
ENDA because it gives them a means of meaningfully distinguishing them­
selves from other employers. 
The Fair Employment mark is particularly helpful here because it is 
something that the employer commits to before it negotiates contracts with 
individual employees. Employees who value nondiscrimination may be re­
luctant to propose such a tenn because it might also signal to the employer 
that the potential employees are litigious. 1 14 But by adopting the mark, the 
employer can satisfy employee demand (at low cost) without requiring this 
kind of signaling. 
1 1 2. Ian Ayres & Richard F. Ober, Jr., Corporate Non-Discrimination Policies: The Hollow 
Promise 3-4 (2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
1 1 3. Id. at 4. 
1 1 4. It is a well-known result of contracting theory that defaults will become sticky 
when suggestions to alter the contract reflect badly on the proposer. Omri Ben-Shahar & John 
Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006), avail­
able at http://www.law.umich.edu/centersandprograms/olin/abstracts/discussionpapers/2005/ 
05-0I Obenshahar.pdf; Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the 
Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, I O I  YALE L.J. 729 ( 1 992); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic 
Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 1 00 YALE L.J. 6 1 5  ( 1 990). 
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Of course, one needs to consider whether adopting the mark would 
make other employees less likely to work for the employer. At least as a 
theoretical matter, adoption could induce employee boycotts. While worthy 
of consideration, we doubt that this is a serious concern. At least with regard 
to employers that have voluntarily included sexual orientation in their non­
discrimination policies, it is unlikely that there would be any additional 
adverse impact of adopting a formal commitment not to discriminate. And 
more generally, the public opinion is strongly in favor of equal employment 
opportunity. It is hard to imagine many applicants saying, "I refuse to work 
for Company X because it promises not to discriminate." 
An employer's adoption of the mark might also be driven by employee 
preferences in another way. Unions might collectively bargain for adoption 
of the mark. Pride at Work, the AFL-CIO affiliate group that promotes 
LGBT employment equality, has already been successful in having formal 
nondiscrimination promises included in union contracts.1 1 5  But unions usu­
ally bargain for enforcement procedures that utilize union grievance 
procedures-and unions may be reluctant to bargain for adoption of the 
mark because it allows individual union members independent private rights 
of action. 116 
Adopting the mark might also facilitate the flow of other inputs, includ­
ing the certification of oversight organizations. Certifying organizations may 
urge or require adoption of a binding commitment not to discriminate. The 
Association of American Law Schools (AALS), for example, not only re­
quires member schools to include sexual orientation in their own 
nondiscrimination policies, but also to stop discrimination by employers 
utilizing the schools' career placement facilities.117 B ut neither of these pro­
visions requires a legally binding promise not to discriminate. For example, 
AALS provides as follows: 
A member school shall inform employers of its obligation under Executive 
Committee Regulation 6-3(b) [the AALS's nondiscrimination policy], and 
shall require employers, as a condition of obtaining any form of placement 
assistance or use of the school's facilities, to provide an assurance of the 
employer's willingness to observe the principles of equal opportunity 
stated in Bylaw 6-3(b). 1 1 8  
1 1 5 .  For a guide to negotiating such contracts, see Pride At Work, Seven Easy Steps For Add­
ing Domestic Partner Benefits To Your Union Contract (Apr. 2005), http://prideatwork.org/ 
public/documents/press/2005/Seven%20Easy%20Steps%20For%20Adding%20Domestic%20Partner 
%20Benefits%20To%20Your%20Union%20Contract.pdf. 
1 1 6. Indeed, it is arguable that an employer's signing of the licensing agreement in any union­
ized setting might constitute a violation of its collective bargain duty. But no union to our 
knowledge has ever complained about inclusion of sexual orientation in nondiscrimination policies 
which, at least probabilistically, also create independent rights of action. 
1 17. ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, 2005 HANDBOOK 60 (2005). 
1 1 8. Id. AALS Bylaw 6-3(b) provides as follows: 
A member school shall pursue a policy of providing its students and graduates with equal op­
portunity to obtain employment, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, 
color, religion, national origin, sex, age, disability, or sexual orientation. A member school 
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Providing "an assurance" of a "willingness to observe the principles of 
equal opportunity" may well fall short of a promise not to discriminate. In­
deed, many law schools fail to require a clear promise. For example, for 
years Yale Law School has merely required employers participating in the 
school's interview programs to sign the following "Non-Discrimination 
Statement": 
I, [Name of Representative] an authorized representative of [Name of Em­
ployer] affirm that said employer is aware of and complies with Yale Law 
School's nondiscrimination policy, as stated below: 
Yale Law School reaffirms its policy against discriminatory employment 
practices. The law school does not countenance any form of discrimination 
based upon age, color, handicap or disability, ethnic or national origin, 
race, religion, religious creed, gender (including discrimination taking the 
form of sexual harassment), marital, parental or veteran status, sexual ori­
entation, or the prejudice of clients. 1 1 9  
The legal effect of this document is not free from doubt. The representa­
tive is signing a "statement," not a "contract." She is "affirming," not 
"promising." The key question is whether "affirm[ing] that said employer 
. . .  complies with" the law school policy of "not countenanc[ing] any form 
of discrimination based upon . . . sexual orientation" is a legally binding 
contractual commitment. And if it is, it is uncertain whether students have 
third-party beneficiary status to enforce violations of the promise. 
But just as the Corporate Equality Index could be easily changed to re­
quire binding legal commitments, the AALS provisions and the law school 
"Non-Discrimination Statement" could be easily changed to require prom­
ises. AALS Bylaw 6.4(b) could be amended in this manner: 
A member school shall eemmttHiettte te require each employer to whom it 
furnishes assistance and facilities for interviewing and other placement 
functions the seheel's fiFm eiqieettttien that the emvleyeF will to promise to 
observe the principle of equal opportunity. 
Alternatively, the AALS might simply require that member schools (1) 
sign the Fair Employment license, and (2) require employers receiving 
placement assistance to sign the license. 1 20 Such a requirement-by a power-
Id. 
shall communicate to each employer to whom it furnishes assistance and facilities for inter­
viewing and other placement functions the school's firm expectation that the employer will 
observe the principle of equal opportunity. 
1 19. Yale Law School Career Development Office, Registration Form for Fall Interview Pro­
gram 2005, http://www.law.yale.edu/outside/pdf/Career_Development/cdo-empreg05.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 26 2006). 
1 20. A third and analogous regulation would be a requirement that member schools promise 
not to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation in their own admissions. AALS Bylaw 6-3(a) 
currently requires that member schools "shall provide equality of opportunity . . .  without discrimi­
nation . . .  on the ground of . . .  sexual orientation." But member schools need to provide applicants 
with a viable private cause of action-and few schools clearly do. ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW 
SCHOOLS, supra note 1 1 7, at 33-34. 
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ful input supplier-would in one fell swoop provide clear and enforceable 
private causes of action to the direct victims of employment discrimination. 
The restrictions on employer recruiting are animated by law schools' de­
sire not to have their facilities used in the service of discrimination. A 
similar motivation might apply to faculty recommendations. Many faculty 
would not want to participate in the evaluation process for an employer that 
retains the legal right to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. The 
Fair Employment mark gives faculty a means to make sure they steer clear 
of such employers. In the not-too-distant future, one could imagine that fac­
ulty might decline to write recommendations to employers that refused to 
sign the license. 
Beyond these requirements, input suppliers can powerfully influence the 
contracting equilibrium just by the way they frame questions. Consider for 
example NALP, the National Association for Law Placement. Its law firm 
questionnaire currently makes the open-ended request: "State your organiza­
tion's nondiscrimination policy."121 But imagine what would happen if 
instead it asked, "Has your organization promised not to discriminate on the 
basis of sexual orientation?" We predict that the vast majority of firms 
would check "Yes" and in so doing would probably give applicants an en­
forceable legal right to sue for violations of the promise.122 Or alternatively, 
NALP could more directly exploit the subject of this Article by asking, "Has 
your organization licensed the Fair Employment mark?" 
At the end of the day, adoption of the license is not just a recruitment 
tool, but for many employers it might be a way of staying in good graces 
with a variety of input suppliers-including certifying and membership or­
ganizations and outside evaluators. Both the push of institutional pressure 
(as already seen in the case of union and AALS requirements) and the pull 
of recruiting advantages (as seen in NALP disclosures of nondiscrimination 
policies) may tip employers toward adoption. 
D. Additional Consumer Demand 
While upstream input suppliers may motivate some employers, the 
prospect of additional downstream demand as a motive for adoption is more 
directly tied to the idea of a certification mark. The Fair Employment mark 
certifies nondiscrimination to potential employees, but like other certifica­
tion marks, the Fair Employment mark can also be used as a marketing tool 
to certify product quality to potential purchasers. In this Section, we will 
explore the plausible impact of the mark on consumer demand-first, in a 
world of "acoustic separation" (where sellers are able to convey a targeted 
message to gay rights supporters without signaling opponents) and second, 
1 2 1 .  National Association of Legal Professionals, Law Firm Questionnaire 2005-2006 Aca­
demic Year, http://www.law2.byu.edu/Career_Services/firrnforrn.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2006). 
1 22. An applicant who had been discriminated against could not only argue that he or she was 
an intended third-party beneficiary of the promise, but could also argue that, by checking the box on 
the NALP recruitment form, the organization was offering not to discriminate in return for the ap­
plicant's application. 
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in a world of full information where the prospect of consumer boycotts must 
be weighed against the benefits of consumer "buycotts." 
1. Government Contractor Ordinances 
Before delving into these questions of impact on generalized consumer 
demand, it is important to appreciate the possible impact of what we might 
call "regulated demand." Just as the last Section illustrated the potential im­
pact of input pressure that has been brought to bear by particular unions and 
certifying organizations, demand-side pressure can be brought to bear by 
particularly powerful individual purchasers-state and local governments. 
Dozens of cities and counties prohibit public contractors from discrimi­
nating on the basis of sexual orientation.123 These government entities in 
effect will only purchase goods and services from suppliers that promise not 
to discriminate. These contractor ordinances are at times redundant with 
state statutory prohibitions on employment discrimination. Thus, for exam­
ple, San Jose's ordinance prohibiting discrimination by city contractors does 
not substantively affect any California suppliers, who are independently 
prohibited from sexual orientation discrimination by state statute.124 But 
these contractor laws have potential bite in two different circumstances. 
First, they have sometimes been adopted by cities and counties located in 
jurisdictions that have not prohibited private employment discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation. For example, Phoenix and Cleveland require 
nondiscrimination by city contractors, but their respective states do not pro­
hibit discrimination by employers generally.125 Second, even in places (such 
as San Jose) where employment discrimination by private employers is gen­
erally prohibited, the local ordinances can still have an impact as local 
governments sometimes contract with out-of-state suppliers that would oth­
erwise be allowed to discriminate. 
But to date, local compliance officers have lacked an effective mecha­
nism for assuring compliance. Much like the AALS and its member schools, 
the compliance officers have been satisfied with contractor assurances that 
they do not discriminate or the contractors' inclusion of sexual orientation in 
their nondiscrimination policies. But as explained above, these nondiscrimi­
nation policies are at times nonbinding commitments, often failing to equip 
the victims of discrimination with effective enforcement mechanisms. The 
advent of the Fair Employment mark changes all this. Compliance officers 
can simply ask whether a contractor has signed the license. As we move 
forward to roll out the mark, we plan to urge local contractor compliance 
1 23. See generally WAYNE VAN DER MEIDE, THE POLICY INST. OF THE NAT'L GAY AND LES­
BIAN TASK FORCE, LEGISLATING EQUALITY: A REVIEW OF LAWS AFFECTING GAY, LESBIAN, 
BISEXUAL, AND ThANSGENDERED PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES (2000), http:// 
www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/legeq99.pdf. 
1 24. Id. 
1 25. See generally PHOENIX, ARIZ., CODE § 18-15 (2005); CLEVELAND, OHIO, ADMIN. CODE 
§ 187.04 ( 1994); CLEVELAND, Omo, OFFENSES & Bus. ACTIVITIES CODE § 667.05 (1997); see also 
TOWN OF LAKE PARK, FLA., CODE § 2-1 10 (1996). 
June 2006] Mark( et)ing Nondiscrimination 1681  
officers to consider promoting o r  requiring the use of the mark as a means of 
fulfilling the cities' requirements. At the very least, the mark should provide 
a credible commitment device for contractors that are trying to demonstrate 
their compliance with a city's nondiscrimination mandate. 
2. The Impact on Demand in a World of "Acoustic Separation " 
An employer may worry that adopting the mark will promote a backlash 
of reduced demand. The very hostility toward gay, lesbian, and bisexual 
people that makes the protections of the mark valuable could also work 
against the mark. Opponents of gay rights can read product labels as well as 
allies, and some companies may refuse to use the mark out of fear of boy­
cotts. But before considering the impact of boycotts, we first explore how 
the mark might work in a world with a kind of "acoustic separation" -that 
is, a world in which the proponents of gay rights learn of a firm's adoption, 
but the opponents of equality do not.126 
The benchmark of "acoustic separation" is not as outlandish as it might 
first appear. The kosher symbol provides one possible illustration. The "U" 
encircled by an "O" is so innocuous that many anti-Semites miss the signal, 
even though they might wish to punish companies that affirmatively market 
products to Jewish consumers. 121 The Fair Employment mark proposed here 
would be similarly opaque. For consumers "in the know," the mark could 
create incentives to buy particular products. But there is nothing about the 
appearance of the mark as proposed to tie it to gay rights or gay people gen­
erally. More explicitly "gay" symbols-a pink triangle, a rainbow flag, or 
the Greek letter lambda-would certainly be more transparent: even con­
sumers who had never heard of the mark would know that the company 
using the symbol is positioning itself in sympathy with the gay community. 
But this more explicit positioning would also run the risk of alienating con­
sumers who are hostile to gay rights (who will react to an explicitly "gay" 
symbol but not to a neutral one). 
Moreover, an employer's adoption of the license gives the employer the 
option, but not the duty, to display the mark. The mark need not be dis­
played on every product or indeed on any product. Licensees may choose to 
display the mark selectively, in contexts where it is more likely that allies 
will see the mark. They might decide to display the mark only in certain 
advertisements or in certain states. 
By reaching out to ally consumers, the Fair Employment mark promotes 
a kind of "buycott." It allows equal rights proponents to "vote with their 
wallets." The time may be particularly ripe to troll for pent up equality de-
1 26. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in 
Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1 984). 
1 27.  Occasionally, anti-Semitic groups do call for boycotts of products labeled as kosher, but 
these movements seem to attract few followers. See, e.g., Anti-Defamation League, Bigotry Over a 
Beer Label, http://www.adl.org/special_reports/kosher_tax/kosher_coors.asp (last visited Jan. 23, 
2006) (noting that some extremist groups call for a boycott of foods and companies that succumb 
to the "kosher conspiracy"). 
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mand. Progressives who are trapped in "red" states do not have a govern­
mental outlet for their political perspective to be heard. Patronizing firms 
that have privately adopted ENDA-have promised not to discriminate-is 
a pragmatic way of making progress on employment equality, particularly 
when local and federal legislatures are not ready to act. 
Even opponents of marriage for same-sex couples could be counted as 
potential consumers of products bearing the mark. A frequent claim of mar­
riage opponents is that they believe in treating gay people fairly, but they 
just think that marriage by definition is between a man and a woman. By 
embracing the Fair Employment mark either as licensees or consumers, 
marriage opponents can prove their bona fides as believers in employment 
equality. 
In recent years, gay rights advocates have sometimes flexed the commu­
nity's economic muscles. The "gay dollar" is now a recognized-if 
controversial-phenomenon. By stamping or writing the words "gay dollar" 
on ordinary dollar bills, the gay community can tangibly signal the number 
of dollars that literally pass through gay hands. These marked dollars are 
meant to demonstrate the spending power of the gay community. The gay 
community and its supporters have sought to exercise that spending power 
positively. For example, when voters in Tampa, Florida, enacted an antigay 
rights ordinance, the Human Rights Task Force of Florida responded by in­
stituting a buycott rather than a boycott. The group published a directory of 
businesses that have "policies in support of gays and lesbians."128 In the first 
five months of the directory's publication, the list grew from 105 to 430 en­
tries. 129 Todd Simmons, spokesperson for the Human Rights Task Force of 
Florida, explained, "We decided on an approach that would empower us 
economically and politically. The buycott has improved our standing in the 
community. Businesses and other institutions have changed their policies to 
get in our book."130 
Large companies have launched advertising campaigns targeted to gay 
consumers, including AT&T, Anheuser-Busch, Apple Computer, Benetton, 
Philip Morris, Seagram, Sony, and Absolut.131 George Slowik, publisher of 
Out magazine, notes that gay men and lesbians are "an audience not accus­
tomed to being courted, so they're more apt to notice who's supportive and 
who's not, particularly at this point. The first ones in will reap extra benefits 
1 28. Michael Wright, Avoidance Tactics, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 1993, at 44, 48. 
1 29. Id. 
1 30. Id. 
1 3 1 .  Stuart Elliott, A Sharper View of Gay Consumers, N.Y. TIMES, June 9 ,  1 994, at D I .  The 
story of Absolut vodka illustrates the way gay and lesbian consumers demonstrate loyalty to suppor­
tive manufacturers and other businesses. Absolut, it seems, was one of the first major labels to 
advertise in gay publications. According to Rick Dean, Vice President of Overlooked Opinions, 
"The gay community tied it back-Absolut was there on the back cover of gay publications before 
the others, and Absolut vodka is poured at gay bars." Mary Gottschalk, Gay Cachet: Advenisers Get 
Wise to the Fact that the Gay and Lesbian Community Is a $500 Billion a Year Gold Mine, SAN JosE 
MERCURY NEWS, Sept. 19, 1993, at IH. 
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in each category."132 The same sort of loyalty that allows a firm to "reap ex­
tra benefits" as the "first one in" could allow the first firms that adopt the 
mark to reap extra revenue from consumers wishing to show their support 
for nondiscrimination. 133 
M.V. Lee Badgett has examined the three distinct roles that gay, lesbian, 
and bisexual people can play in an economic system: "consumers," "inves­
tors," and "producers."134 Many companies have recognized the LGBT 
community as an important group of consumers and have developed adver­
tising to target this market. The concerns of gay people and their allies as 
investors are reflected in rating systems that grade companies for their gay­
friendliness. 135 As producers, LGBT people get some recognition in nondis­
crimination policies, statutes, and local ordinances; employee benefit 
programs; and other incentives offered by companies that wish to recruit 
talented people, regardless of sexual orientation. Tools like the HRC Corpo­
rate Equality Index can help potential employees to identify the companies 
that respect LGBT people as producers. The Fair Employment mark com­
plements these existing strategies as it conveys information about 
companies' employment practices to a wider audience in a decentralized 
way. In a sense, the mark completes the circle by allowing gay and nongay 
consumers to tie their purchasing decisions to the fair treatment of gay and 
lesbian employees. 
A key characteristic of the mark is that it could facilitate heterosexual 
support for gay rights in ways that need not be public. This could create op­
portunities to work for gay rights for a new group of "stealth" supporters­
people who, for any number of reasons, are not able or willing to act pub­
licly, but who wish at the very least to spend their money responsibly. As 
heterosexual consumers begin to feel aligned with the cause through their 
purchasing decisions, other more public forms of support might start to feel 
comfortable as well. Perhaps most importantly, from simple, every day con­
sumer choices, an internal sense of connection to and identification with 
LGBT people could grow. This internal change might lead nongay people to 
act-especially to speak up for equality in various contexts. Thus, a small 
132. Id. 
133.  This brand loyalty is  also evident in the travel industry. According to one marketing 
executive, "All a mainstream company has to do is show up at a gay travel expo and because of 
brand loyalty, gay and gay-friendly travelers will use them and their business will increase." Stu 
Glauberman, Gay Tourism: Island Companies Tap a Growing Market, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, 
Feb. 14, 1 994, at C l .  
134. M.V. Lee Badgett, Thinking Homo/Economically, i n  OVERCOMING HETEROSEXISM AND 
HOMOPHOBIA: STRATEGIES THAT WORIC 380 (James T. Sears & Walter L. Williams eds., 1997). 
1 35.  The Equality Project, for example, "is a consumer, employee and investor advocacy 
coalition working to support and monitor workplace awareness and adoption of the progressive 
policies expressed in the Equality Principles as endorsed by leading LGBT organizations." The 
Equality Project, http://www.equalityproject.org/content/accomp.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2006). 
The HRC Corporate Equality Index also helps investors avoid discriminatory companies and direct 
their money to companies that treat LGBT employees fairly. Human Rights Campaign Foundation, 
supra note 68. 
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symbol on a product label could help to mobilize a broader base of hetero­
sexual support for LGBT equality. 
3. The Impact on Demand: Boycotts 
Notwithstanding the innocuous nature of the mark itself and notwith­
standing the selective and targeted disclosure of the mark by licensees, it is 
still possible that adopting the mark will cause a licensee to lose some po­
tential consumers of its goods or services. Adopting the mark may cause a 
conservative group to call for boycotts of the gay-friendly company. Even 
more troublesome, licensees must consider whether adoption will cause in­
dividual consumers independently to shift their consumption to other 
suppliers. Consumers may be turned off by the politicization of the product. 
The privacy of the grocery aisle, which liberates allies to purchase the prod­
uct without being challenged, also may liberate opponents to buy a close 
substitute without being challenged. Indeed, the decision to switch might 
not even be based on conscious disapproval of the firm's adoption of the 
mark; it might be an unconscious or implicit attitude.136 While boycotts are 
seldom effective, 137 the fear of individual, unconscious turnoffs should not 
be ignored by any profit-maximizing producer. 
The concern that the mark may disaffect some consumers may be par­
ticularly important for firms with large market shares. In concentrated 
industries where a few companies have captured the market, each company 
has a lot to lose if it alienates a significant portion of the market. In such 
markets, a boycott could cause real economic loss if antigay consumers far 
outnumber pro-gay consumers. In such circumstances, it will always be in at 
least one company's self-interest to reject the mark-being known as the 
one company that is not "gay friendly" could help that company capture 
antigay consumers' business (just as the Fair Employment mark would help 
companies capture the business of pro-gay consumers). 
But in markets with many firms, the story is very different. Even in a 
world where opponents of employment equality substantially outnumber 
equality advocates, there will be robust incentives for a few of the firms to 
adopt the mark. To see how this works, let's imagine a stylized market con­
sisting of ten hammer makers. Suppose that hammers are so uniform that 
consumers are completely indifferent about the source of hammers they buy; 
consumers purchase randomly, so each manufacturer gets 10% of the mar­
ket. Suppose further that 5% of customers support equal employment rights 
for gay men and lesbians so strongly that they will go out of their way to 
buy hammers from the company that treats gay employees fairly.138 We are 
I 36. See generally Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition: 
Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes 102 PsYCHOL. REV. 4 ( 1 995). 
1 37. Brown, supra note 95, at 8 12. 
1 38. On one hand, this seems to be an extremely conservative assumption, since eighty-eight 
percent of Americans oppose employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, accord­
ing to a 2003 Gallup Poll. GEORGE GALLUP, JR., supra note 1 ,  at 1 60, 1 62; see also L.A. TIMES 
June 2006] Mark( et)ing Nondiscrimination 1 685 
not assuming that 5% would cut off their arm to further gay rights, but other 
things being equal (such as price) , they would strongly prefer sellers that 
promised not to discriminate. But imagine that four times as many consum­
ers-20%-actively dislike or disapprove of gays (enough that they will 
avoid purchasing from companies that treat gay employees fairly). The re­
maining 75% of the consumers do not care one way or the other. 
Now consider what happens to the first company adopting the Fair Em­
ployment mark. Even if that company loses all of its business from the 
antigay consumers, that difference is more than made up by the pro-gay 
consumers who are induced to buy products bearing the mark. The first 
mover increases from a market share of 1 0% (before using the mark) to a 
12.5% market share after adopting the Fair Employment mark. This increase 
in demand results despite the fact that the company loses its share of the 
antigay customers' business. The company is still getting its random tenth of 
the consumers who don't care (one-tenth of 75% = 7.5%), plus all of the 
consumers who support gay rights (5%). 
How can this be-that a firm has an incentive to adopt the mark when 
consumers who dislike the mark outnumber those who like it four to one? 
The answer is that most of the opponents were not going to buy from the 
first-adopter firm anyway. Because there were ten identical firms in the 
market, the first adopter only had a 1 0% chance of getting any consumer to 
buy. From the first-adopter's perspectives, the antigay consumers fall from a 
10% chance to a 0% chance of buying. But the pro-gay consumers rise from 
a 10% chance to a 100% chance of buying. Because of this disproportionate 
change in shifting probabilities, the buycott effect is likely to be much 
stronger than the boycott effect for first-adopters in markets with many 
firms. Of course, in the real world the pro-gay consumers will not go all the 
way to 100% probability of buying-but the underlying idea that first­
adopters will not be deterred, even in the face of considerable antigay con­
sumer sentiment, still holds true. 
Indeed, in our stylized example, a second firm will have an incentive to 
use the mark as well. The two "marked" firms will now split the pro-gay 
consumers, so each gets 1 0% of the market-7.5% (one-tenth of consumers 
who do not care) plus 2.5 %  (half the pro-gay consumers).139 In equilibrium, 
all the firms will have the same 1 0% market shares that they began with. An 
economist at Columbia piped up at a presentation of this paper and was 
heard to say, "So the mark didn't make any difference." How wrong he was! 
Even though market shares settle back to their pre-mark status, employment 
protections for 20% of gay and lesbian employees in the industry have im­
proved. 
This example suggests that the Fair Employment mark could create 
some very strong "first mover" advantages-if only to capture the gay-
POLL, supra note 1 .  On the other hand, this group of Americans might not feel so strongly about the 
issue that they would make purchasing decisions based on it. 
1 39. Some of the remaining eight firms may affirmatively signal their antipathy for gays to 
gain some of the antigay consumers. 
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supportive consumers who remain brand-loyal even after other brands adopt 
the mark. 140 In a generalized version of this example, we would expect at 
least one adopter as long as there are at least five firms. 141 But there is also a 
very strong incentive for another company to become the "second mover." 
If we more realistically assume that the distribution of the pre-mark 
market share is not random, we still see that producers with small market 
shares will have incentives to adopt the mark. Assume a ten-company indus­
try in which five companies have 15% market shares and five companies 
have 5% market shares. If one of the smaller-share companies were to adopt 
the mark, it would stand to move from a 5% share to an 8.75% share-all of 
the pro-gay consumers (5%) plus one-twentieth of the neutral consumers 
(3.75% ). This is a sizable jump, one that would raise the company's sales by 
75%. As long as one firm in the industry has less than a 20% market share, 
there will be at least one firm with an economic incentive to adopt the li­
cense. Additional firms will adopt as long as the resulting market share of 
the adopters is less than or equal to 20%. 142 In this asymmetric market share 
example, in equilibrium, four firms that start with 5% market shares will 
have incentives to adopt the mark. 
This example shows that the potential benefits of using the Fair Em­
ployment mark could outweigh the potential costs, at least for a few 
companies. But we should emphasize that the assumed four-to-one ratio of 
antigay to pro-gay consumers is wildly at odds with the public attitude to­
ward equal employment rights. In a world where 88% of Gallup respondents 
say it is wrong to discriminate in employment on the basis of sexual orienta­
tion, it is inconceivable that 20% of consumers would actively shun a 
product that promised not to discriminate. Instead, the point of the exercise 
is to emphasize that the threat of demand reduction does not pose an im­
pediment to adoption of the mark by part of an industry. Just as smallness is 
a spur to Delaware's innovation in corporate federalism/43 theory suggests 
that fringe firms with smaller market shares should lead the way with the 
Fair Employment mark. 
E. Corporate Morality 
Firms that have already publicly embraced nondiscrimination on the ba­
sis of sexual orientation are likely adopters of the Fair Employment license. 
Organizations that identify with a commitment to the cause of equality may 
140. The first mover also has a better chance of selling the product to antigay consumers 
before they catch on to the meaning of the mark, but we hesitate to give much weight to this sneaky 
motivation. 
1 4 1 .  If P = proportion of pro-gay consumers, A =  proportion of antigay consumers, and N = 
number of firms, then it can be shown that at least one firm will adopt the license so long as (N-1 )P > A. The largest integer smaller than N*P/ A defines the number of firms that will adopt. 
142. More generally (using the notation of the previous footnote), firms will continue to adopt 
as long as the total market share of adopting firms is below P/(P+A). 
143. Brown, supra note 95, at 819;  Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the 
Incorporation Puule, 1 J.L. EcoN. & 0RG. 225, 225-27 (1985). 
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adopt the mark not because of the foregoing recruiting or marketing bene­
fits, but merely because licensing is consistent with the organization's self­
conception. 
While it is natural to think of employers as corporations with a single­
minded profit motive, there are many nonprofit employers that by definition 
pursue other goals. For example, universities are nonprofits that employ 
substantial numbers of people. It should be no surprise from an organiza­
tional-identity perspective that these academic nonprofits have taken a lead 
in including sexual orientation in their nondiscrimination policies. Employ­
ers that have included sexual orientation in their nondiscrimination policies 
are therefore natural candidates for adoption of the Fair Employment mark. 
A subset of these employers that have already adopted nondiscrimina­
tion policies are especially likely to adopt the mark. The Human Rights 
Campaign has been successful in convincing over a hundred corporations to 
endorse the passage of ENDA.144 These corporations that have said they 
want to be bound by the substantive duties of ENDA would be hard-pressed 
not to adopt a license imposing these same duties. 
Of course, a corporation might argue that it would only be willing to 
take on these duties if its competitors had to as well. After all, it is not un­
reasonable to support a fifty-cent gasoline tax if borne by all, but protest if 
asked to pay it individually. Given our earlier empiricism on claiming rates 
under state nondiscrimination statutes, it is unlikely that fear of competitive 
cost disadvantage would chill an endorser's willingness to adopt the license. 
But the cost of potential boycotts might scare a firm with large market share 
from becoming a first mover. Such a firm would probably prefer that the 
nondiscrimination norm become mandatory to forestall loss of customers. 
We believe there are strong reasons to expect a predictable subset of 
employers to sign the licensing agreement. The identifiable employers 
would be those who ( 1) have relatively small market shares; (2) have al­
ready included sexual orientation in their nondiscrimination policies or 
publicly endorsed ENDA; (3) supply cities that require public contractors 
not to discriminate; (4) are members of certifying organizations that prohibit 
discrimination; or (5) are located in jurisdictions that independently prohibit 
sexual orientation discrimination. 
Of course, some employers might believe that the benefits of signing 
outweigh its costs, but still resist because they fear "slippery slopes." If they 
make this promise, they might worry that a never-ending parade of other 
144. The list includes a variety of blue-chip stocks and household names: Agilent Technolo­
gies Inc., Apple Computer Inc., AT&T, Bausch & Lomb, Ben & Jerry's Homemade Ice Cream, 
Borland International, BP, Capital One Financial Corp., Charles Schwab & Co. Inc., Chubb Corp., 
Cisco Systems, Coors Brewing Co., Coming Inc., Digi-Net Syndication, Eastman Kodak, Electronic 
Arts, FleetBoston Financial Corp., Trillium Asset Management, General Mills, Hewlett-Packard 
Co., Hill and Knowlton, Honeywell, IBM, Imation, Intel Corp., JP Morgan Chase & Co., John Han­
cock Financial Services Inc., Kaiser Permanente, Levi Strauss & Co., Louis Dreyfus Corp., MFS 
Investment Management, Microsoft, Millipore Corp., Nationwide, Nike Inc., Oracle Corp., Pruden­
tial Insurance Co., Quark, SGI, Shell Oil Co., Software Spectrum Inc., State Street Corp., The 
Quaker Oats Company, Triarc Beverage Group, Verizon Communications, Wainwright Bank, World­
span L.P., Xerox, Yahoo Inc. Human Rights Campaign Foundation, supra note 45. 
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certification promises will follow, with pressure applied to sign each one. 
This argument, like others, will have different salience for different employ­
ers. The same slippery slope argument could be used to resist including 
additional categories in a firm's nondiscrimination policy: if an employer 
includes sexual orientation, it will then be pressured to include gender iden­
tity (or attractiveness, or weight). But employers that have been willing to 
take on this slippery slope risk in including sexual orientation in their non­
discrimination policies are more likely to be willing to take on some 
additional slippery slope risk with regard to legal commitments not to dis­
criminate. 
IV. RESPONDING TO CRITICISMS 
The last Part was concerned with whether too few employers would sign 
the licensing agreement. Here we ask the converse question: will too many 
employers sign? Specifically, this Part takes on four different criticisms con­
cerning privatization of civil rights duties. Could it be that giving employers 
a convenient mechanism to promise not to discriminate somehow hurts the 
cause of employment equality? 
A. Reducing Demand for a Statutory Prohibition 
As an initial matter, we should consider whether the Fair Employment 
mark might take the wind out of the sails of the push for passage of ENDA 
itself. We have argued for the mark as an incremental strategy that could be 
used as a step in the process of compelling all employers not to discriminate 
on the basis of sexual orientation. But a pervasive concern with incremental­
ism is the possibility that it will cause a movement to stall out short of its 
ultimate goal. The privatization of ENDA duties might work as a substitute, 
rather than a complement, to national passage of legislation protecting les­
bian and gay people in employment. 
This concern recently drove the leading marriage equality group in Con­
necticut, Loves Makes a Family, to oppose a civil-union bill for same-sex 
couples. Although the civil-union bill would immediately grant same-sex 
couples all of the legal rights of marriage (and represent the first time that a 
state legislature free from court order had conferred full benefits),145 the 
group worried that legalizing civil unions would take the "wind out of the 
sails" of the equal marriage rights movement.146 The group's executive direc­
tor, Anne Stanback, told the joint judiciary committee of the General 
1 45.  California has come close with domestic partnership, however. 
1 46. Daniela Altimari, Lawmakers Favor Civil Unions, Despite Objections, HARTFORD 
COURANT, Feb. 8, 2005, at B l  ("Stanback said that she would rather the legislature do nothing than 
approve civil unions, which she said aren't a 'stepping stone' on the road to gay marriage but a 
stopping point in the debate. Since Vermont enacted civil unions, its legislature now has no interest 
in revisiting gay marriage, she said."). 
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Assembly that she feared a civil-union bill would not be a stepping stone to 
marriage but a stopping point. 147 
As a theoretical matter, we might be agnostic about whether voluntary 
adoption by a portion of employers would increase or decrease demand for a 
mandatory ENDA-like statute. We might expect a snowball effect as mo­
mentum grows behind employment protections for gay and lesbian people. 
But from a public-choice perspective, if adoption of the mark satisfied the 
demands of the most ardent proponents of nondiscrimination, the Fair Em­
ployment mark could reduce the pressure for a federal statute. City and state 
laws prohibiting discrimination could have a similar impact. Charles Shipan 
and Craig Volden have empirically measured these competing snowball­
versus-pressure valve effects with regard to the diffusion of city antismok­
ing laws. 148 In this context, they concluded that the "snowball effect" 
dominated-states were more likely to pass antismoking legislation if cities 
had already enacted similar legislation. 
We think a snowball effect is likely to dominate here as well. The thirst 
of gay rights proponents will not be quenched by partial, voluntary adop­
tion. We imagine that employers will adopt the mark as a beacon to other 
like-minded employers. Ultimately, the covered entities will want their 
competitors to be covered as well. This is especially true once there is suffi­
cient entry into the market to dilute away the initial advantage of first-mover 
licensees. 
In our stylized market of ten hammer manufacturers, the first adopter in­
creased its market share. This sole adopter would not benefit from the 
passage of ENDA. But in that example, the adoption of the mark by a sec­
ond firm absorbed the economic advantage and returned all ten firms to their 
ex ante market shares. It is at this point that adopters as well as non-adopters 
would welcome the legislation that "forces" them to do what they would 
want to do anyway-hire the most qualified individual. Moreover, the dem­
onstration benefits of the mark that we described above are benefits that 
lower the cost of enacting. Public support for the law, low litigation rates, 
and some record of how courts interpret the statutory language are elements 
that could enhance the "snowball" impact of the law. 
When push comes to shove, it is difficult to tum down the immediate 
"bird in the hand" benefits of incremental progress. Indeed, returning to the 
Connecticut civil-union debate, it should not surprise us that Love Makes a 
Family ultimately softened its stance on civil unions. When a civil-union bill 
was eventually voted out of committee, the group chose not to oppose it-
147. Id. Stanback initially testified that, if a civil union bill was brought up for a vote, Love 
Makes a Family (LMF) would lobby for its defeat. LMF subsequently withdrew this threat when 
members decided that defeat of the civil union bill would do more harm than good, and Anne Stan­
back declared it a "great day" when Connecticut Governor Jodi Rell signed the civil union bill into 
law. Gregory B. Hladky, Rell Signs Civil Union Legislation into Law, NEW HAVEN REGISTER, Apr. 
2 1 ,  2005, at A l .  
148. Charles R .  Shipan & Craig Volden, Policy Diffusion from Cities to States: Antismoking 
Laws in the U.S. (Jan. 3 1 ,  2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/ 
leo/papers/shipan. pdf. 
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even as it continued to press for marriage equality. It is similarly difficult to 
oppose an effort to give gay and lesbian employees an enforceable nondis­
crimination promise-even if federal legislation is the ultimate goal. 
B. Contingent Demand for a Statutory Prohibition 
A related concern is that the mark might promote a kind of conditional 
demand for statutory prohibitions. Think of this as the dark side of the dem­
onstration benefit. The experience of the licensees provides legislatures with 
valuable information. But what happens if this information is bad news? 
What happens if we find that (1) few employers adopt the mark; (2) there is 
an unexpectedly large amount of litigation (leading chastened employers to 
terminate their licenses) ; or (3) "activist" judges and juries149 radically ex­
pand the contours of liability (also leading chastened employers to terminate 
their licenses)? 
The demonstration effects of the mark could make legislators' support 
for civil rights empirically contingent. The norm of nondiscrimination be­
comes a hostage to fortune. Some might argue that it is wrong to hitch our 
wagon to such an uncertain star. 
We disagree. This is a situation where more information is a good 
thing.150 Let's consider the list in reverse order. If judges are misconstruing 
the intended duties of ENDA, it is appropriate for legislators to take these 
precedents into account in redrafting the statute. If the mark leads to unex­
pectedly high litigation rates, Congress (and society) might learn that there 
is more disparate treatment on the basis of sexual orientation than we had 
earlier perceived. However, if the litigation spike is caused by frivolous or 
unsubstantiated claims (reflected in high rates of summary judgment or 
dismissal for failure to state a claim), we think it is again appropriate for 
legislators to consider these effects in deciding whether to redraft the statute. 
Finally, we believe that even if firms fail to adopt the mark, this does not 
necessarily send a dire negative signal. The mark is a sufficiently novel idea 
that lack of adoption can be explained away by a number of neutral reasons, 
including (misguided) narrow self-interest. 
And if history is any indication, the news about the mark will not be 
bad. One of the most startling things about some gay rights victories is how 
149. In 199 1 ,  Congress amended Title Vil to create the right to trial by jury and to entitle 
plaintiffs to recover compensatory and punitive damages, within certain caps based on the size of 
the employer. See Civil Rights Act of 199 1 ,  42 U.S.C. § 1 98 l a(c)(l )  (2000). Just as Title VII cases 
can be tried to a jury, so too ENDA claims seeking compensatory or punitive damages would almost 
surely be subject to jury trial. Section l 2(b) of ENDA makes "the procedures and remedies applica­
ble to a claim alleged by an individual for a violation of this Act" the same as "the procedures and 
remedies applicable for a violation of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1 964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et 
seq.)." S. 1 705, 108th Cong. § 1 2(b) (2003). As is true in civil cases generally, the jury trial may be 
waived if no demand is made for a jury or if a demand has been made but all parties subsequently 
agree to waiver. See FED. R. C1v. P. 38(d); id. 39(a)(l ). 
1 50. But see Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Ian Ayres, Economic Rationales for Mediation, 80 
VA. L. REv. 323 ( 1994); Ian Ayres & Barry Nalebuff, Common Knowledge as a Barrier to Negotia­
tion, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1 63 1  ( 1 997); and BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DoLLARS 
(2002), for circumstances in which non-transparency can promote social welfare. 
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little they change the world for most people. Marriage was extended to 
same-sex couples in Massachusetts (as well as some Western European 
countries) and the sky did not fall. Openly gay and lesbian service members 
were welcomed into the armed forces of the European Union and we see 
business as usual (even when those forces cooperate with their American 
colleagues). The experience of the seventeen jurisdictions that already pro­
hibit private employment discrimination shows us that adoption of the mark 
is not likely to open a Pandora's box of litigation or unwarranted claims. 
This is a bet that proponents of gay rights should be willing to make. 
C. Commodifying Equality 
A third concern about the mark is that it could cause the concept of 
equality to slip from being an inalienable right to a commodity which em­
ployers guarantee only if the cost is low. Our earlier economic appeals for 
adoption might offend some who believe that right-minded employers 
should support nondiscrimination simply because it is a basic human right. 
To commodify the value of equality is to suggest an invidious economic 
calculus. 
To these concerns, we plead guilty. And we confess: we are commodifi­
ers. But we are also pragmatists. We have the strong sense that 
nondiscrimination in employment is consistent with robust capitalism. Once 
people see that employment equality does not undermine profitability, it will 
be very hard to take away. To our minds, securing this basic right a few 
years earlier is worth the psychological cost of commodification. 
In many ways, the ship of commodification has already sailed. When 
HRC tries to convince employers to endorse ENDA or adopt the HRC 100% 
mark, its arguments in large part tum on the economic benefits, especially in 
recruiting talented employees. And this is as it should be. It is wrong to 
think that "corporate morality" is an oxymoron, but it is naive to think that 
all moral arguments must scrupulously ignore their impact on a decision­
maker's profitability. 
D. Closeting Equality 
A final concern about the mark is that it will not only commodify civil 
rights norms, but also privatize the norms in ways that set back the larger 
cause. Gay, lesbian, and bisexual people, as well as gay rights scholars, 
know well the dangers of the closet. Or the animus that can drive this de­
mand: "We don't care what gay people do in the privacy of their own 
bedrooms, just don't ask us to recognize them in the public sphere." Critics 
could complain that the mark responds to an analogous (and equally prob­
lematic) demand: "We don't care what you companies do for gay people in 
the privacy of your own boardroom, just don't ask us to recognize it in the 
public sphere." Instead of framing nondiscrimination as a public value, the 
mark may contribute to a reconceptualization of it as merely a private choice 
upon which the government should not tread. 
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Although worthy of consideration, this closeting concern is unlikely to 
arise. The adoption of the mark is itself a public act. While we allow licen­
sees to practice the mark selectively, we as licensors-much like HRC with 
regard to corporate endorsers of ENDA-will maintain on the Internet a 
public database of adopters.151 Revealing the complete list of adopters also 
reveals those employers that have not adopted. So both the adoption and 
non-adoption of the mark become common knowledge. While a corporation 
could respond that the contours of its employment promises are private, the 
social meaning of certification marks is necessarily public. 
And as argued earlier, the likely impact of private adoptions is to in­
crease the demand for public mandates. The net result is that massive 
licensing of the mark would not denigrate equality to merely a private cor­
porate choice shielded from public purview. Instead, nondiscrimination in 
the shadow of many adoptions would increasingly fuel demands for univer­
sal, mandatory norms. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article strives to do more than show the possibility of privatizing 
ENDA. It is performative as well. The Fair Employment mark now exists 
and is open for business. The licensing agreement in the Appendix can be 
copied, signed, and faxed to us by any employer and it will immediately 
take effect. (The signed and completed agreement can be faxed to Ian Ayres 
at 203-432-4769.) Or employers can go to www.fairemploymentmark.org 
and license the mark with just a few clicks of the mouse. With the publica­
tion of this Article, we hereby announce a formal licensing campaign. We 
intend to take the descriptive theory of Part ill and use it to target employers 
that are more likely to be willing to adopt the mark. We hope within a year 
and a half to have 100,000 workers covered. 
Although this Article has been a sustained attempt at defending and ex­
plicating the feasibility of the Fair Employment mark as a specific means of 
privatizing ENDA, the Article in a broader sense is a call for more explicit 
contracting. The earlier movement for non-binding policies was itself a use­
ful form of incrementalism. Even these non-binding or probabilistically­
binding policies signaled the employer's viewpoint that homosexuality was 
not malum in se. The policies at a minimum conveyed the employer's aspi­
ration. These mere words strongly suggested that one's sexual orientation 
would not be per se disqualifying. At the very least, they allowed the possi­
bility of nonlegal enforcement. An employer that included sexual orientation 
in its nondiscrimination policy but nonetheless countenanced blatant dis­
crimination might be publicly ridiculed. But the time to take the next 
incremental step is now. 
Instead of asking for nondiscrimination policies, we should begin asking 
for nondiscrimination promises. We should demand more than hortatory 
claims of nondiscrimination. If nondiscrimination means anything, it should 
1 5 1 .  See Human Rights Campaign Foundation, supra note 45. 
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mean that an employer legally commits not to engage in disparate treatment. 
The current policies are too close to "cheap talk" that can actually border on 
fraud. An applicant can read the pretty words of nondiscrimination and then 
be surprised to learn that, since she was never in privity with the employer, 
she has no cause of action. Our claim is simply that these nondiscrimination 
rights should now have legal remedies. 
The next time you are at a meeting and you hear your own employer ex­
tol its nondiscrimination policy, you should speak up and ask, "Are you 
promising not to discriminate?" We are not posing a hypothetical. We call 
upon our academic readers to challenge their deans and university presidents 
(as well as the nonprofit boards on which they sit): "Is this institution will­
ing to promise not to discriminate?" What are they going to say in response? 
"We take our nondiscrimination policy very seriously, but no, we're not 
willing to promise not to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation."152 
We are about to have a test-and you, gentle reader, are one of the subjects. 
1 52. As we script this conversation, we might suggest you make this retort: "And would you 
opt out of Title VII generally, given the chance?" 
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APPENDIX 
LICENSING AGREEMENT FOR THE FAIR EMPLOYMENT MARK 
This AGREEMENT is made by and between: 
Ian Ayres & Jennifer Gerarda Brown, individuals residing in New Haven, 
CT (hereinafter "Licensor"), and 
(hereinafter "Licensee"), 
[please insert name of employer/firm] 
WHEREAS, Licensor has devised a Fair Employment Mark (hereinafter 
"the Mark"), a copy of which is attached as Attachment A to this agreement, 
and has developed goodwill associated with the Mark and the names "Fair 
Employment Mark," and "fairemploymentmark.org." 
WHEREAS, Licensee and Licensor desire to enter into an agreement per­
taining to the Mark whereby Licensee shall have the right to use the Mark; 
WHEREAS Licensee desires to privately commit to non-discrimination as 
defined in the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) as proposed in 
S. 1705, 108'h Cong., 1" Sess. (2003), which is attached as Attachment B to 
this agreement. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual agreements contained 
herein and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and suffi­
ciency of which is hereby acknowledged, Licensor and Licensee agree as 
follows: 
1. GRANT OF LICENSE. Licensor hereby grants to Licensee a license 
to use the Mark and all goodwill associated therewith as embodied by 
the term "the Mark", including, but not limited to, using the Mark in Li­
censee's products, services, and advertising materials. 
2. TERM. The term of the license herein granted shall be five years ("the 
Term"), and renewed automatically upon for another five years at the 
end of every previous Term unless otherwise terminated by either party 
as set forth in Paragraph 13. 
3. CONSIDERATION. In exchange for Licensor licensing the Mark to 
Licensee, Licensee promises to abide by the standards of fair employ­
ment defined in the next paragraph. 
4. STANDARDS OF FAIR EMPLOYMENT. Licensee promises not to 
engage in the following employment practices: 
(1) "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise 
to discriminate against any individual with respect to the compensation, 
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terms, conditions, or privileges of employment of the individual, be­
cause of such individual's sexual orientation;" ENDA, S. 1 705, § 
4(a)( l )  (attached hereto) or 
(2) "to limit, segregate, or classify the employees or applicants for em­
ployment of the employer in any way that would deprive or tend to 
deprive any individual of employment or otherwise adversely affect the 
status of the individual as an employee, because of such individual's 
sexual orientation;" ENDA, S. 1705, §4 (a)(2) (attached hereto) 
(3) to discriminate against any individual because of the sexual orienta­
tion of the individual "in admission to, or employment in, any program 
established to provide apprenticeship or other training;" ENDA, S. 
1705, §4(d) (attached hereto) 
( 4) to discriminate against an individual because such individual op­
posed any of the employment practices described in subsections ( 1) 
through (3), "or because such individual made a charge, testified, as­
sisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or 
hearing" concerned with this License. ENDA, S. 1 705, §5 (attached 
hereto) 
The employment practices described in any of subsections (1) through 
(3) "shall be considered to include an action described in that subsec­
tion, taken against an individual based on the sexual orientation of a 
person with whom the individual associates or has associated." ENDA, 
S. 1 705, §4 (e) (attached hereto) 
5. THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARIES. Licensee and Licensor agree to 
designate as express third-party beneficiaries of this agreement all per­
sons and entities that would be entitled to sue if ENDA were in effect 
(including governmental civil rights enforcement agencies). In particu­
lar, Licensee and Licensor designate as express third-party beneficiaries 
all persons who are or have been employed by the Licensee or applied 
for employment with the Licensee during the term of the license. The 
Licensee and Licensor intend that these third-party beneficiaries will 
have the right to sue the Licensee for any breach of this agreement and 
have a legal right to the same remedies (including damages and injunc­
tive relief) to which they would be entitled if ENDA were in effect. 
6. DISPARATE IMPACT AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION. Disparate 
impact claims may not be brought under this License agreement. The 
Licensee by signing this agreement does not promise to engage in af­
firmative action on the basis of sexual orientation, and affirmative 
action for a breach of this agreement may not be imposed. See ENDA, 
S. 1705, § §4(f), 12(d) (attached hereto) 
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7. BENEFITS. This License shall not be construed to require the provi­
sion of employee benefits to an individual for the benefit of the 
domestic partner of such individual. 
8. COOPERATION. In exchange for the license granted herein, Licensee 
agrees to cooperate reasonably with the Licensor's requests for materi­
als useful to Licensor in maintenance and renewal of the Mark, 
including but not limited to, specimens of use of the Mark in connection 
with Licensee's offering of goods and services, and lists of goods and 
services offered by the Licensee in connection with the Mark. 
9. OWNERSHIP OF THE MARK. Licensee acknowledges that Licen­
sor is the owner of the Mark and that all of Licensee's use of the Mark 
and any goodwill established in association with Licensee's use of the 
Mark shall inure to the benefit of Licensor. Apart from actions of fraud, 
misrepresentation and the like, Licensee shall not contest or deny the 
ownership or validity of the Mark or the title of the Licensor thereto. 
10. LIMITED WARRANTY. Licensor hereby warrants that it has no ac­
tual knowledge of any trademark, service mark, collective mark or 
certification mark rights of any third-party which would impair Licen­
see's use of the Mark. Licensor further warrants that it has no actual 
knowledge of any adversarial proceeding or other license concerning 
the Mark. Licensor does not warrant that the Mark is a valid certifica­
tion mark recognized by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. 
11. CERTIFICATION. Licensor does not certify that Licensee in fact 
abides by the Standards of Fair Employment. But Licensor certifies that 
Licensee by signing this agreement (1) has promised to abide by the 
Standards of Fair Employment and (2) has granted third-party benefici­
ary rights to the individuals and entities enumerated above to enforce 
breaches of the Licensee's promise to abide by the Standards of Fair 
Employment. 
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12. INFRINGEMENT BY THIRD PARTIES. The parties acknowledge 
their joint interest and obligation in policing the Mark and of notifying 
the other in the event that any potential infringement is found. Specifi­
cally, Licensee and Licensor agree promptly to give notice to the other 
of any infringement of the Mark or any threatened litigation or proceed­
ing involving the Mark. Licensor shall not be obliged to take any action 
whatsoever against third parties who are infringing or believed to be in­
fringing the Mark except as Licensor, in its sole discretion, shall deem 
advisable. Any action taken by Licensor on its own initiative shall be 
solely within its discretion, control and expense. If Licensee makes a 
written request to Licensor to take action against an alleged third-party 
infringer, Licensor may, in its discretion, elect not to take any action 
against such third-party infringer. In this event, or if Licensor does not 
respond to the aforementioned written request in seven (7) days, Licen­
see, at its sole cost, control, discretion and expense, shall be free to 
undertake any action against such a third-party infringer. In such an 
event, Licensee shall have the right to select its own counsel and Licen­
see shall keep Licensor completely informed of all developments. 
Except as set forth above, Licensee shall not institute any legal or ad­
ministrative proceeding against any third-party with respect to the Mark 
without the prior written consent of Licensor. Licensor and Licensee 
may agree to permit themselves to be named in any adversarial action 
reasonably required to police and protect the Mark. In the event that Li­
censor does agree to participate in an adversarial proceeding instituted 
by the Licensee, the Licensee shall indemnify the Licensor. Licensor 
and Licensee agree to cooperate fully with the other in any defense or 
assertion of rights associated with the Mark. 
13. TERMINATION. The Licensee for any reason can immediately termi­
nate this agreement prior to the normal expiration of the Term by 
sending a written notice of termination by mail to the Licensor. The Li­
censor can terminate this agreement prior to the normal expiration of 
the Term if the Licensee shall be in breach of any material obligation set 
forth herein. Termination by the Licensor shall be effected by delivery 
of notice to the Licensee which notice expressly and in detail sets forth 
the basis for termination. This Agreement will terminate sixty (60) days 
after the Licensor shall send by mail notice of termination. 
14. ENFORCEMENT. The Licensor waives any and all rights to sue Li­
censee for violation of the Standards of Fair Employment, but retains 
the right to sue the Licensee for unauthorized use of the Mark (includ­
ing use of the Mark after termination of the license). Third-party 
beneficiaries have the exclusive rights to sue the Licensee for violation 
of the Standards of Fair Employment. Any lawsuit by a third-party 
beneficiary for violation of the Standards of Fair Employment shall be 
filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged violating em­
ployment practice occurred. 
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15. REMEDIES. The remedies applicable to a claim alleged by a third­
party beneficiary for a violation of the Standards of Fair Employment 
shall include all "remedies applicable for a violation of title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.)." ENDA S. 1705, 
§ 12(b)(l) (attached hereto). All specific remedies provided for in this 
Agreement shall be cumulative and shall not be exclusive of one an­
other or of any other remedies available in law or in equity. The failure 
to insist upon strict performance of any of the covenants or terms hereof 
to be performed shall not be construed as a waiver of such covenants or 
terms. Should either the Licensee or the Licensor file litigation against 
the other party to enforce the terms of this Agreement, then the non­
breaching party in such litigation as determined by a final, non­
appealable order of a court of competent jurisdiction shall be entitled to 
receive from the breaching party all of its costs and expenses in such 
litigation including reasonable attorneys' fees. 
16. ENTIRE AGREEMENT. This Agreement constitutes the entire agree­
ment between the parties solely with respect to the licensing of the 
Mark. The Agreement supersedes any prior agreements or understand­
ings, whether written or oral, between or among the parties regarding 
the licensing of the Mark. The parties agree that this Agreement may 
not be amended or changed in any way except by written instruments 
signed by each of the parties hereto. 
17. CHOICE OF LAW AND FORUM. Except to the extent governed by 
the Lanham Act ( 1 5  U.S.C. §§ 1051 et seq.),  this Agreement shall be in­
terpreted and construed pursuant to the law of the State of Connecticut 
without regard to its conflict of laws. The Standards of Fair Employ­
ment of this license shall be interpreted in cases of ambiguity to impose 
the same duties on the Licensor as would apply if the version of ENDA 
attached as Attachment B had been enacted by Congress and was in 
force. Any lawsuit filed in connection with this Agreement by either li­
censor or licensee against the other shall be in a court located in the 
State of Connecticut. Any lawsuit filed in connect with this Agreement 
by a third-party beneficiary shall be in a court located in the state where 
the alleged violation of the Standards of Fair Employment occurred. 
18. ASSIGNMENTS AND BINDING EFFECT. Licensee shall not di­
rectly or indirectly assign, sub-license, pledge, encumber, grant or 
otherwise transfer any of its rights conferred by this Agreement. This 
Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of each of the 
parties hereto and each of their respective authorized purchasers, suc­
cessors and assigns. 
19. WAIVER. The waiver by any party of a breach or provision of this 
Agreement shall not operate or be construed as a waiver of any subse­
quent breach by such other party. 
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20. SEVERABILITY. If any provision of this Agreement is held to be 
illegal, invalid, or unenforceable under any law, rule, or regulation, such 
provision shall be fully severable and this Agreement shall be construed 
and enforced as if such illegal, invalid, or unenforceable provision never 
comprised a part hereof. The remaining provisions of this Agreement 
shall remain in full force and effect, and shall not be affected by the il­
legal, invalid, or unenforceable provision or by its severance herefrom. 
21. RECITALS AND HEADINGS. The recitals contained in this Agree­
ment are an integral part hereof and this Agreement shall be construed 
in light of such recitals. The captions and headings contained herein are 
for convenient reference only and shall not be construed as a part 
hereof. 
22. COUNTERPART AGREEMENTS. This Agreement may be executed 
by each of the parties in separate counterpart and have the same force 
and effect as if it had been executed as a single document. 
23. NOTICE. Any notice or other communication required, contemplated 
or permitted under the terms of this Agreement must be given in writing 
by U.S. post or by overnight courier such as DHL, Federal Express, or 
Express Mail. Notice shall be deemed effective on the date sent. All no­
tices or formal communications pursuant to this Agreement shall be sent 
to the parties as follows: 
June 2006) Mark( et)ing Nondiscrimination 
To Licensor: Ian Ayres & Jennifer Gerarda Brown 
1 27 Wall Street 
New Haven, CT 065 1 1  
To Licensee: 
[insert name and mailing address] 
1 70 1  
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreement by 
and through their properly authorized signatories effective as of the date 
indicated above. 
Licensor S!gnatures: 
� i=:  
Dated: '/j/ ftjo 'i 
Licensee Signature: 
[authorized signature] 
[print name] 
[print title] 
Dated: ______ _ 
Approximate number of employees currently employed by Licensee: 
Please fax the completed and signed agreement to Ian Ayres at (203) 432-
4769. 
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ATTACHMENT B 
108th CONGRESS 
1. 1 st Session 
S. 1705 
To prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. 
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 
October 2, 2003 
Mr. KENNEDY (for himself, Mr. JEFFORDS, Mr. CHAFEE, Mr. 
LIEBERMAN, Mr. AKA.KA, Mr. BAUCUS, Mr. BAYH, Mr. BIDEN, Mr. 
BINGAMAN, Mrs. BOXER, Mr. BREAUX, Ms. CANTWELL, Mr. 
CARPER, Mrs. CLINTON, Ms. COLLINS, Mr. CORZINE, Mr. DASCHLE, 
Mr. DAYTON, Mr. DODD, Mr. DORGAN, Mr. DURBIN, Mr. EDWARDS, 
Mr. FEINGOLD, Mrs. FEINSTEIN, Mr. GRAHAM of Florida, Mr. 
HARKIN, Mr. INOUYE, Mr. KERRY, Mr. KOHL, Ms. LANDRIEU, Mr. 
LAUTENBERG, Mr. LEAHY, Mr. LEVIN, Ms. MIKULSKI, Mrs. 
MURRAY, Mr. NELSON of Florida, Mr. REED, Mr. REID, Mr. 
SARBANES, Mr. SCHUMER, Mr. SMITH, Mr. SPECTER, Ms. 
STABENOW, and Mr. WYDEN) introduced the following bill; which was 
read twice and referred to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and 
Pensions 
A BILL 
To prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the 'Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 
2003' .  
SEC. 2 .  PURPOSES. 
The purposes of this Act are--
(1) to provide a comprehensive Federal prohibition of employ­
ment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation; 
(2) to provide meaningful and effective remedies for employ­
ment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation; and 
(3) to invoke congressional powers, including the powers to 
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enforce the 14th amendment to the Constitution, and to regulate 
interstate commerce and provide for the general welfare pursuant 
to section 8 of article I of the Constitution, in order to prohibit 
employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. 
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS. 
(a) IN GENERAL- In this Act: 
(1)  COMMISSION- The term 'Commission' means the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission. 
(2) COVERED ENTITY- The term 'covered entity' means an 
employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor­
management committee. 
(3) EMPLOYEE-
(A) IN GENERAL- The term 'employee' means--
(i) an employee (as defined in section 701 (t) of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 
2000e(t)); 
(ii) a Presidential appointee or State employee 
to which section 302(a)(l)  of the Government 
Employee Rights Act of 1991  (42 U.S.C. 
2000e- 16b(a)( l )) applies; 
(iii) a covered employee, as defined in section 
101  of the Congressional Accountability Act of 
1995 (2 U.S.C. 1301) or section 41  l (c) of title 
3, United States Code; or 
(iv) an employee or applicant to which section 
7 17(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 
U.S.C. 2000e- 16(a)) applies. 
(B) EXCEPTION- The provisions of this Act that apply 
to an employee or individual shall not apply to a volun­
teer who receives no compensation. 
(4) EMPLOYER- The term 'employer' means--
(A) a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce 
(as defined in section 701 (h) of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e(h)) who has 15 or more employ­
ees (as defined in subparagraphs (A)(i) and (B) of 
paragraph (3)) for each working day in each of 20 or 
more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calen­
dar year, and any agent of such a person, but does not 
include a bona fide private membership club (other than 
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a labor organization) that is exempt from taxation under 
section 501 (c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; 
(B) an employing authority to which section 302(a)(l) 
of the Government Employee Rights Act of 1991 ap­
plies; 
(C) an employing office, as defined in section 101 of the 
Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 or section 
4 1 1(c) of title 3, United States Code; or 
(D) an entity to which section 7 17(a) of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 applies. 
(5) EMPLOYMENT AGENCY- The term 'employment agency' 
has the meaning given the term in section 701 (c) of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e(c)). 
(6) LABOR ORGANIZATION- The term 'labor organization' 
has the meaning given the term in section 701(d) of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e(d)). 
(7) PERSON- The term 'person' has the meaning given the term 
in section 70l (a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 
2000e(a)). 
(8) RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION- The term 'religious organi­
zation' means--
(A) a religious corporation, association, or society; or 
(B) a school, college, university, or other educational in­
stitution or institution of learning, if--
(i) the institution is in whole or substantial part 
controlled, managed, owned, or supported by a 
religion, religious corporation, association, or 
society; or 
(ii) the curriculum of the institution is directed 
toward the propagation of a religion. 
(9) SEXUAL ORIENTATION- The term 'sexual orientation' 
means homosexuality, bisexuality, or heterosexuality, whether 
the orientation is real or perceived. 
(10) STATE- The term 'State' has the meaning given the term in 
section 701(i) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 
2000e(i)). 
(b) APPLICATION OF DEFINITIONS- For purposes of this section, a 
reference in section 701 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964--
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( 1 )  to an employee or an employer shall be considered to refer to 
an employee (as defined in paragraph (3)) or an employer (as de­
fined in paragraph (4)), respectively, except as provided in 
paragraph (2); and 
(2) to an employer in subsection (f) of that section shall be con­
sidered to refer to an employer (as defined in paragraph (4)(A)). 
SEC. 4. DISCRIMINATION PROHIBITED. 
(a) EMPLOYER PRACTICES- It shall be an unlawful employment prac­
tice for an employer--
(1)  to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or oth­
erwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to the 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment of 
the individual, because of such individual's sexual orientation; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify the employees or applicants for 
employment of the employer in any way that would deprive or 
tend to deprive any individual of employment or otherwise ad­
versely affect the status of the individual as an employee, 
because of such individual's sexual orientation. 
(b) EMPLOYMENT AGENCY PRACTICES- It shall be an unlawful 
employment practice for an employment agency to fail or refuse to refer 
for employment, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual be­
cause of the sexual orientation of the individual or to classify or refer for 
employment any individual on the basis of the sexual orientation of the 
individual. 
(c) LABOR ORGANIZATION PRACTICES- It shall be an unlawful 
employment practice for a labor organization--
( 1 )  to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to 
discriminate against, any individual because of the sexual orien­
tation of the individual; 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership or applicants 
for membership, or to classify or fail or refuse to refer for em­
ployment any individual, in any way that would deprive or tend 
to deprive any individual of employment, or would limit such 
employment or otherwise adversely affect the status of the indi­
vidual as an employee or as an applicant for employment, 
because of such individual's sexual orientation; or 
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate 
against an individual in violation of this section. 
(d) TRAINING PROGRAMS- It shall be an unlawful employment prac­
tice for any employer, labor organization, or joint labor-management 
committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, in-
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eluding on-the-job training programs, to discriminate against any individ­
ual because of the sexual orientation of the individual in admission to, or 
employment in, any program established to provide apprenticeship or 
other training. 
(e) ASSOCIATION- An unlawful employment practice described in any 
of subsections (a) through (d) shall be considered to include an action de­
scribed in that subsection, taken against an individual based on the sexual 
orientation of a person with whom the individual associates or has associ­
ated. 
(f) DISPARATE IMPACT- Only disparate treatment claims may be 
brought under this Act. 
SEC. 5. RETALIATION PROHIBITED. 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a covered entity to dis­
criminate against an individual because such individual opposed any 
practice made an unlawful employment practice by this Act, or because 
such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any 
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this Act. 
SEC. 6. BENEFITS. 
This Act does not apply to the provision of employee benefits to an indi­
vidual for the benefit of the domestic partner of such individual. 
SEC. 7. COLLECTION OF STATISTICS PROHIBITED. 
The Commission shall not collect statistics on sexual orientation from 
covered entities, or compel the collection of such statistics by covered en­
tities. 
SEC. 8. QUOTAS AND PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT 
PROHIBITED. 
(a) QUOTAS- A covered entity shall not adopt or implement a quota on 
the basis of sexual orientation. 
(b) PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT- A covered entity shall not give 
preferential treatment to an individual on the basis of sexual orientation. 
(c) ORDERS AND CONSENT DECREES- Notwithstanding any other 
provision of this Act, an order or consent decree entered for a violation of 
this Act may not include a quota, or preferential treatment to an individ­
ual, based on sexual orientation. 
SEC. 9. RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION. 
This Act shall not apply to a religious organization. 
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SEC. 10. NONAPPLICATION TO MEMBERS OF THE ARMED 
FORCES; VETERANS' PREFERENCES. 
(a) ARMED FORCES-
(1)  EMPLOYMENT- In this Act, the term 'employment' does 
not apply to the relationship between the United States and 
members of the Armed Forces. 
(2) ARMED FORCES- In paragraph ( 1 ), the term 'Armed 
Forces' means the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and 
Coast Guard. 
(b) VETERANS' PREFERENCES- This Act does not repeal or modify 
any Federal, State, territorial, or local law creating a special right or pref­
erence concerning employment for a veteran. 
SEC. 1 1. CONSTRUCTION. 
(a) EMPLOYER RULES AND POLICIES- Nothing in this Act shall be 
construed to prohibit a covered entity from enforcing rules and policies, if 
the rules or policies are designed for, and uniformly applied to, all indi­
viduals regardless of sexual orientation. 
(b) ASSOCIATION- Nothing in this Act shall be construed to prohibit 
any association, or infringe upon any right of association, guaranteed by 
the first amendment 
to the Constitution, of any nonprofit, voluntary membership organization. 
SEC. 12. ENFORCEMENT. 
(a) ENFORCEMENT POWERS- With respect to the administration and 
enforcement of this Act in the case of a claim alleged by an individual for 
a violation of this Act--
( 1 )  the Commission shall have the same powers as the Commis­
sion has to administer and enforce--
(A) title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 
2000e et seq.); or 
(B) sections 302 and 304 of the Government Employee 
Rights Act of 199 1  (42 U.S.C. 2000e- 16b and 2000e-
16c); 
in the case of a claim alleged by such individual for a violation 
of such title, or of section 302(a)( l )  of the Government Em­
ployee Rights Act of 1991  (42 U.S.C. 2000e- 16b(a)( l )), 
respectively; 
(2) the Librarian of Congress shall have the same powers as the 
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Librarian of Congress has to administer and enforce title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.) in the case 
of a claim alleged by such individual for a violation of such title; 
(3) the Board (as defined in section 101  of the Congressional 
Accountability Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 1301)) shall have the same 
powers as the Board has to administer and enforce the Congres­
sional Accountability Act of 1 995 (2 U.S.C. 1301 et seq.) in the 
case of a claim alleged by such individual for a violation of sec­
tion 201(a)(l )  of such Act (2 U.S.C. 1 3 1  l (a)(l )) ;  
(4) the Attorney General shall have the same powers as the At­
torney General has to administer and enforce--
(A) title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 
2000e et seq.); or 
(B) sections 302 and 304 of the Government Employee 
Rights Act of 1991 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-16b and 2000e-
16c); 
in the case of a claim alleged by such individual for a violation 
of such title, or of section 302(a)(l )  of the Government Em­
ployee Rights Act of 1991  (42 U.S.C. 2000e- 16b(a)(l )), 
respectively; 
(5) the President, the Commission, and the Merit Systems Pro­
tection Board shall have the same powers as the President, the 
Commission, and the Board, respectively, have to administer and 
enforce chapter 5 of title 3, United States Code, in the case of a 
claim alleged by such individual for a violation of section 4 1 1 of 
such title; 
(6) a court of the United States shall have the same jurisdiction 
and powers as the court has to enforce--
(A) title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 
2000e et seq.) in the case of a claim alleged by such in­
dividual for a violation of such title; 
(B) sections 302 and 304 of the Government Employee 
Rights Act of 1991  (42 U.S.C. 2000e- 16b and 2000e-
16c) in the case of a claim alleged by such individual for 
a violation of section 302(a)( l )  of such Act (42 U.S.C. 
2000e- 16b(a)(l)) ;  
(C) the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 (2 
U.S.C. 1301 et seq.) in the case of a claim alleged by 
such individual for a violation of section 20l (a)( l )  of 
such Act (2 U.S.C. 1 3 1  l (a)(l )) ;  and 
(D) chapter 5 of title 3, United States Code, in the case 
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of a claim alleged by such individual for a violation of 
section 41 1 of such title. 
(b) PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES- The procedures and remedies ap­
plicable to a claim alleged by an individual for a violation of this Act are--
( 1 )  the procedures and remedies applicable for a violation of title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.) in 
the case of a claim alleged by such individual for a violation of 
such title; 
(2) the procedures and remedies applicable for a violation of sec­
tion 302(a)( l )  of the Government Employee Rights Act of 199 1  
(42 U.S.C. 2000e-16b(a)(l)) in the case of a claim alleged by 
such individual for a violation of such section; 
(3) the procedures and remedies applicable for a violation of sec­
tion 201(a)(l )  of the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 
(2 U.S.C. 1 3 1 1 (a)(l)) in the case of a claim alleged by such indi­
vidual for a violation of such section; and 
(4) the procedures and remedies applicable for a violation of sec­
tion 41 1 of title 3, United States Code, in the case of a claim 
alleged by such individual for a violation of such section. 
(c) OTHER APPLICABLE PROVISIONS- With respect to a claim al­
leged by a covered employee (as defined in section 101  of the 
Congressional Accountability Act of 
1995 (2 U.S.C. 1 301)) for a violation of this Act, title ill of the Congressional 
Accountability Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 138 1 et seq.) shall apply in the same 
manner as such title applies with respect to a claim alleged by such a covered 
employee for a violation of section 20l(a)(l )  of such Act (2 U.S.C. 
1 3 1 1 (a)( l )). 
(d) PROHIBITION OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION- Notwithstanding any 
other provision of this section, affirmative action for a violation of this 
Act may not be imposed. Nothing in this section shall prevent the grant­
ing of relief to any individual who suffers a violation of such individual's 
rights provided in this Act. 
SEC. 13. STATE AND FEDERAL IMMUNITY. 
(a) STATE IMMUNITY- A State shall not be immune under the 1 1th 
amendment to the Constitution from a suit described in subsection (b) and 
brought in a Federal court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this 
Act. 
(b) REMEDIES FOR STATE EMPLOYEES­
( 1 )  IN GENERAL-
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(A) WAIVER- A State's receipt or use of Federal finan­
cial assistance for any program or activity of a State 
shall constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity, under 
the 1 1th amendment to the Constitution or otherwise, to 
a suit brought by an employee or applicant for employ­
ment of that program or activity under this Act for a 
remedy authorized under subsection (c). 
(B) DEFINITION- In this paragraph, the term 'program 
or activity' has the meaning given the term in section 
606 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d-
4a). 
(2) OFFICIALS- An official of a State may be sued in the offi­
cial capacity of the official by any employee or applicant for 
employment who has complied with the applicable procedures of 
section 1 2, for equitable relief that is authorized under this Act. 
In such a suit the court may award to the prevailing party those 
costs authorized by section 722 of the Revised Statutes ( 42 
u.s.c. 1 988). 
(3) EFFECTIVE DATE- With respect to a particular program or 
activity, paragraphs (1)  and (2) apply to conduct occurring on or 
after the day, after the date of enactment of this Act, on which a 
State first receives or uses Federal financial assistance for that 
program or activity. 
(c) REMEDIES AGAINST THE UNITED STATES AND THE STATES­
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, in an action or adminis­
trative proceeding against the United States or a State for a violation of 
this Act, remedies (including remedies at law and in equity, and interest) 
are available for the violation to the same extent as the remedies are avail­
able for a violation of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ( 42 U .S.C. 
2000e et seq.) by a private entity, except that--
( 1 )  punitive damages are not available; and 
(2) compensatory damages are available to the extent specified in 
section 1977A(b) of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. 198 l a(b)). 
SEC. 14. ATTORNEYS' FEES. 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, in an action or adminis­
trative proceeding for a violation of this Act, an entity described in 
section 1 2(a) (other than paragraph (4) of such section), in the discretion 
of the entity, may allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission 
or the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee (including expert fees) as 
part of the costs. The Commission and the United States shall be liable 
for the costs to the same extent as a private person. 
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SEC. 15. POSTING NOTICES. 
A covered entity who is required to post notices described in section 7 1 1  
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e- 10) shall post notices 
for employees, applicants for employment, and members, to whom the 
provisions specified in section 1 2(b) apply, that describe the applicable 
provisions of this Act in the manner prescribed by, and subject to the pen­
alty provided under, section 7 1 1  of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
SEC. 16. REGULATIONS. 
(a) IN GENERAL- Except as provided in subsections (b), (c), and (d), the 
Commission shall have authority to issue regulations to carry out this Act. 
(b) LIBRARIAN OF CONGRESS- The Librarian of Congress shall have 
authority to issue regulations to carry out this Act with respect to employ­
ees and applicants for employment of the Library of Congress. 
(c) BOARD- The Board referred to in section 12(a)(3) shall have author­
ity to issue regulations to carry out this Act, in accordance with section 
304 of the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 1384), 
with respect to covered employees, as defined in section 101  of such Act 
(2 u.s.c. 1 301) .  
(d) PRESIDENT- The President shall have authority to issue regulations 
to carry out this Act with respect to covered employees, as defined in sec­
tion 4 1 1 (c) of title 3, United States Code. 
SEC. 17. RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER LAWS. 
This Act shall not invalidate or limit the rights, remedies, or procedures 
available to an individual claiming discrimination prohibited under any 
other Federal law or any law of a State or political subdivision of a State. 
SEC. 18. SEVERABILITY. 
If any provision of this Act, or the application of the provision to any per­
son or circumstance, is held to be invalid, the remainder of this Act and 
the application of the provision to any other person or circumstance shall 
not be affected by the invalidity. 
SEC. 19. EFFECTIVE DATE. 
This Act shall take effect 60 days after the date of enactment of this Act 
and shall not apply to conduct occurring before the effective date. 
END 
